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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2005, a biotech company named Transkaryotic 
Therapies (TKT) decided to sell itself to Shire Pharmaceuticals Group 
(Shire).1  Shire agreed to pay $37 for each share of TKT, representing a 
44% premium over the prior month’s average price.2  Under Delaware 
General Corporation Law (DGCL), the deal required approval by a majority 
 
*  John V. Ray Research Professor of Law and Director of the Law & Business Program, The 
University of Virginia School of Law.  E-mail: geis@virginia.edu.  Thanks to Afra Afsharipour, Steven 
Davidoff, Mike Dooley, Joan Heminway, Rich Hynes, Ed Kitch, and Charles Whitehead for helpful 
conversations and comments.  I am also grateful for feedback and suggestions during a presentation of 
this paper at the 2010 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Conference.  Finally, thanks to Ravi 
Agarwal, Sarah Chase-Levenson, Patrick Mitchell, Josh Morales, and Tim Ormsby for helpful research 
assistance.  All errors are mine. 
1  In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1 
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).  The transaction received even more attention for a related lawsuit exploring the 
appropriate scope of state-law disclosure obligations in In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 
346 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
2  Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1. 
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of TKT’s voting shareholders.3  Thus, the next obvious question was: Who 
owned the shares? 
This was not as easy to determine as one might expect: contrary to our 
common sense expectations, public companies do not keep a long list of 
their shareholders hidden away in an underground vault or an encrypted 
database file.  The technical answer was that TKT, like almost all other 
publicly held companies, recorded an obscure firm named Cede & 
Company (Cede) as the registered owner for most of its stock.4  But Cede, 
better known by the name of its affiliate, the Depository Trust Corporation 
(DTC), is not some trillion-dollar hedge fund; it only holds the shares as a 
clearinghouse to help buyers and sellers execute trades efficiently.5 
In the Transkaryotic merger, then, presumably the parties with a real 
economic interest, the beneficial owners, would tell Cede how to vote their 
shares.  In the end, Cede voted approximately 12.9 million shares in favor 
of the merger, approximately 9.9 million shares against the merger, and 
withheld votes on roughly 7 million shares.6  This, combined with a 
favorable vote for the shares not held by Cede, ultimately amounted to 52% 
support for the merger—just enough to approve the deal.7 
Yet, as you might suspect by the close vote, not everyone was pleased 
with the $37 offer price.  A group of twelve beneficial owners, holding 
nearly 11 million shares, decided to file an appraisal claim.8  Appraisal 
laws, in a nutshell, allow shareholders to sue for the “fair value” of their 
shares (as determined through judicial proceedings) when they object to a 
merger or related fundamental transaction.9  But the procedural 
 
3  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2010). 
4  In this case, Cede held roughly 29.7 million shares of the 35.6 million total shares of TKT eligible 
to vote (about 83%).  Opening Brief in Support of Respondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
at 4, Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345 (No. 1554-N), 2006 WL 4775227, at *4. 
5  See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 
1237–38 (2008). 
6  Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1.  The practice of withholding votes might be 
done at the specific request of the beneficial owners or, more commonly, because the owner never 
returns voting instructions.  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1249–51.  In this transaction, 47,416 
shares requested abstention and 6,943,962 shares ignored the ballot.  Opening Brief in Support of 
Respondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 4. 
7  Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1. 
8  Id. 
9  See Paul G. Mahoney & Mark Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 239, 239 (1999).  Triggering mechanisms for appraisal rights differ by jurisdiction.  Id. at 
239, 243.  Every state grants appraisal rights for statutory merger transactions, many offer the remedy 
when a firm sells “substantially all of the corporation’s assets,” and a majority offer the rights during 
corporate charter amendments.  See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: 
Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (1995).  Likewise, the extent to which appraisal is 
available for shareholders of an acquiring firm differs by jurisdiction.  See id. at 14–15. 
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requirements to perfect an appraisal claim are Byzantine,10 and here a 
crucial issue surfaced.  Under Delaware law, an owner forfeits appraisal 
rights if she votes in favor of the merger.11  How, then, had this dissenting 
dozen voted their shares? 
The answer was easy for a quarter of the dissenting shares.  The 
petitioners had owned this stock on the record date—when the firm’s books 
were frozen in order to identify which shareholders received voting rights—
and they told Cede to vote these shares against the merger.12  But the 
dissenters purchased the balance of their equity stake, approximately 8 
million shares, after the record date, though before the date of the 
shareholders’ meeting where the votes were tallied.13  This meant that they 
did not have the right to vote these shares; that privilege remained with the 
selling beneficial owners.14  So which of the shares held by Cede did the 
petitioners buy: some of the 12.9 million shares that eventually voted in 
favor of the merger, or some of the 16.9 million shares that abstained or 
voted against the deal?  If the former, then petitioners failed to perfect their 
appraisal remedy and it was destroyed.  If the latter, then the claim could 
proceed. 
As this Article will demonstrate, it is impossible to answer this 
question in a conclusive and meaningful way.  Indeed, under current 
exchange settlement practices the inquiry makes little sense.  Cede merely 
holds a large pool of undifferentiated shares and does not specifically trace 
stock certificates to beneficial owners.  There is no possible way to know 
which group of shares the petitioners bought or, therefore, how the stock 
ultimately purchased by the petitioners was voted by the previous owners. 
The Chancery Court, while clearly aware of this mess,15 finessed the 
problem in a summary judgment opinion.  It relied on precedent and a 
literal reading of the Delaware appraisal statute to maintain that the “holder 
of record” had to abstain or vote against the merger in order to perfect 
appraisal rights.16  In this case, then, the standard was met.  Cede was the 
record holder, and it had voted (or withheld) nearly 17 million shares 
against the deal.  The petitioners were now seeking to exercise appraisal 
 
10  See Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 240; see also infra Part I.B (tracing the basic 
mechanics for filing an appraisal claim in Delaware). 
11  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2010). 
12  Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1. 
13  Id. 
14  See id.  There is some precedent for a buyer to reclaim merger voting rights by obtaining 
irrevocable proxies from a selling shareholder, but as I discuss infra note 113, these proxy transfers are 
exceptionally difficult to track and implement. 
15  See Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *2–5. 
16  Id. at *3 (quoting § 262) (internal quotation mark omitted).  This language reflects 1967 
amendments to section 262.  Prior to that, the statute simply stated that appraisal rights were available 
for “stockholders.”  See Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems: Reflections on the 
Delaware Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 15 n.52 (1994). 
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rights for 12 million shares through Cede, the same record owner.  That was 
enough for the court.  In other words, who cares if the beneficial owners 
seeking appraisal were not the beneficial owners that had cast the votes?  
As long as there were enough “qualified” nonpositive votes to cover the 
petitioners’ claims, then appraisal rights were still available.17 
This literalistic holding may have been the most sensible thing for the 
court to do under the circumstances.18  But Transkaryotic raises the ante on 
appraisal in a way that was certainly never contemplated by the statute’s 
drafters.  What happens if a very high percentage of after-bought shares 
seek appraisal when only a handful of shares actually vote against the deal? 
Can everyone pursue the claim?  Should the rights be prorated?  Does Cede 
now assume the responsibility of figuring this out?  Should new legal 
“look-through” standards be developed?  In short, we have a tricky new 
appraisal puzzle. 
Furthermore, this mystery of mistaken identity is important because it 
impacts the balance of power between majority and minority shareholders.19  
For instance, it is possible that a robust market for appraisal rights will 
develop, analogous to the market for corporate control that allegedly 
disciplines otherwise entrenched managers with the threat of an external 
takeover.20 
Indeed, Transkaryotic illustrates this exact point.  There was some 
intrigue surrounding the timing of the sell-out because the directors struck 
this deal right before the firm was due to receive test results for a promising 
 
17  See Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *4 (“Cede, the record holder, properly 
perfected appraisal rights under § 262.  As a result, Cede may exercise appraisal rights for all 
10,972,650 contested shares.”). 
18  Title 8, section 262(a) of the DGCL expressly defines the shareholder eligible for appraisal as “a 
holder of record of stock in a corporation.”  § 262(a).  Case law confirms the court’s view by insisting 
that the record owner must bring appraisal claims on behalf of beneficial owners.  See, e.g., Olivetti 
Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d 683, 687 (Del. 1966) (finding that in appraisal 
proceedings, “the relationship between, and the rights and obligations of, a registered stockholder and 
his beneficial owner are not relevant issues”); Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A.2d 583, 589 (Del. 
1945) (“[A corporation] may rightfully look to the corporate books as the sole evidence of 
membership.”). 
19  The governance tension between majority and minority shareholders is starting to receive 
significant attention in academic literature.  See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties 
for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008); Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 
YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2005) (identifying “social welfare costs” of the current statutory regime, including the 
possibility of exploiting the freezeout merger doctrine to the detriment of minority shareholders).  This 
is not to say, of course, that these issues were ignored in earlier times.  See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 
U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (describing “dominant or controlling stockholder[s] or group[s] of stockholders” as 
fiduciaries); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719–20 (Del. 1971) (articulating fiduciary 
standards of review for controlling majority shareholders). 
20  See sources cited infra note 155. 
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new drug.21  The test results came back overwhelmingly positive, before the 
date of the merger vote22—a fact which undoubtedly caused some 
shareholders to grumble at the $37 offer price.  Was this a situation where 
the buyer had somehow gotten wind of the good news and sought to 
expropriate value from TKT shareholders?23 
The stench attracted some new characters, including the well-known 
shareholder activist Carl Icahn.24  These new purchasers quickly assembled 
large ownership blocks.25  Though they bemoaned the inability to vote 
against the merger (as the record date had passed), these activists promised 
to pursue after-announcement appraisal lawsuits as a way to obtain full 
value for the shares,26 thus giving rise to the identity puzzle presented by the 
case.  Similarly, ownership ambiguity and any resulting amplification of 
appraisal rights might be seen as a positive development for protecting 
against abusive freezeout mergers by allowing dissenters to gather the scale 
needed to pursue meaningful appraisal claims.27  Channeled appropriately, 
this would be a cause for celebration. 
But there is also a risk that appraisal statutes will become warped far 
beyond their intended purpose, turning into a new vehicle for meritless 
strike suits rather than an effective tool for corporate governance.  Majority 
holders or synergistic outside buyers may shun sensible deals if merger 
announcements routinely bring a new appraisal tax.28  Indeed, despite the 
favorable summary judgment ruling, petitioners in Transkaryotic eventually 
settled their claim for the initial $37 merger consideration (plus interest), 
 
21  See Tom Gardner, When Shareholders Attack, MOTLEY FOOL (July 22, 2005), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/small-cap/2005/07/22/when-shareholders-attack.aspx (describing the 
general intrigue, along with the CEO’s instant resignation in protest of the board’s decision). 
22  Id. 
23  Apparently Shire’s CEO was also caught crowing about the extraordinary deal he was able to get 
on the Transkaryotic acquisition.  Id. 
24  See Phil Milford, Icahn’s High River Sues Shire over 2005 Purchase, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 
2007, 4:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiHYVX9bM_ao; 
Robert Steyer, Transkaryotic Gets Enough Shareholder Support, THE STREET (July 27, 2005, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10235094/1/transkaryotic-gets-enough-shareholder-support.html. 
25  Steyer, supra note 24 (noting that Porter Orlin LLC and Millenco LP pledged to seek “appraisal 
rights for their combined holdings of 16.1%”). 
26  Id. 
27  The assembly of large back-end positions is also necessary because appraisal statutes do not 
typically allow for class action litigation.  See Thompson, supra note 9, at 41. 
28  To be sure, there is a contractual countermeasure that potential buyers might implement: 
including an appraisal condition giving them an out if, say, 15% or more of the shares seek appraisal 
rights.  As I discuss infra Part III.A, this may protect buyers from incurring litigation costs, but there 
will still be social welfare losses if buyers abandon synergistic mergers. 
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thereby throwing their claims of purported price inadequacy into question.29  
How, then, should we unpack the effects of this problem? 
This Article describes the appraisal identity puzzle, analyzes the 
theoretical implications for the majority–minority governance relationship, 
and evaluates some normative responses.  There are several possible 
approaches, ranging from doing nothing to pervasively rewiring the systems 
that support equity exchange.  My recommended response, however, is to 
use these developments as a springboard for pursuing intermediate reforms 
focused on modifying the procedures for perfecting appraisal rights and 
determining share value. 
We should start by assuming that these developments have made it 
easier for dissenting investors, including post-record date purchasers, to 
pursue appraisal claims when they are dissatisfied with a buyout offer or 
freezeout merger pricing.30  Accepting—perhaps even embracing—this 
wider path to appraisal, we should then add new rules that deter dissenters 
from launching strike suits or holding out for unreasonably high prices.  
Specifically, dissenting shareholders (at any stage in the merger timeline) 
should be required to write the controlling shareholder an embedded option, 
coupled with a requested fair price, in order to perfect the appraisal claim.  
Obviously, if the controlling shareholder is willing to raise the price to this 
requested amount, then the matter is finished.  The embedded option would 
allow the controlling shareholder to sell new shares to the dissenter at the 
same price that the dissenter requested under appraisal proceedings.  This 
would effectively require dissenters to put their money where their mouth 
is—allowing the pursuit of appraisal in cases where a dissenter truly 
believes that the price is inadequate but scaring off disingenuous claims 
with the possibility that the dissenter would be forced to buy at the inflated 
price demand.  Said differently, we would make it easier to initiate claims 
while parsing the actual legal entitlement of appraisal more finely through 
the use of embedded options.31 
 
29  Press Release, Shire plc, Shire Successfully Settles Former TKT Shareholder Appraisal Rights 
Litigation (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://www.shire.com/shireplc/uploads/press/
TKTappraisalrights05Nov08.pdf. 
30  I will conduct most of the analysis in this Article through the lens of freezeout merger 
transactions because more conventional mergers can be structured in many states to avoid triggering 
appraisal rights.  With freezeout mergers, however, dissenting shareholders will usually have an 
opportunity to obtain appraisal, either during the initial transaction or during a follow-on short form 
merger.  This is also consistent with recent empirical studies of the appraisal case law, which show how 
these disputes increasingly arise during freezeout transactions.  See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 9, at 9–
10. 
31  The notion of constructing intermediate legal entitlements via embedded options or other means 
has received increasing attention in the legal commentary.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal 
Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 743–44 
(1996); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1433–44 (2005). 
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This proposal may seem complicated, but an example should help to 
illustrate.  Simplify the facts of Transkaryotic to assume that a single 60% 
shareholder is conducting a freezeout merger at $37 per share.  Louis 
Latecomer buys a 15% block, after the record date but before the vote, and 
seeks appraisal.  Following the precedent of the actual case, Latecomer is 
free to pursue appraisal (assuming at least 15% of the shares abstain or vote 
“no”) even though he personally votes no shares.  But now, under the 
modified appraisal proceedings, Latecomer must name a fair price for his 
shares and attach an embedded option to perfect the claim.  Say he chooses 
$50.  The controller then has a choice: (1) pay Latecomer the higher price, 
(2) exercise the embedded put option to sell Latecomer 15% of the shares at 
$50, or (3) litigate.  If $50 is really a fair price, then Latecomer should have 
little reason to object (after all, he named the price of the option).  If, on the 
other hand, Latecomer has overreached with an excessively high price, then 
he will regret buying shares at $50.  Indeed, the mere threat of the controller 
exercising this embedded option should deter Latecomer from mounting a 
strike suit in the first place.  In short, this proposal draws upon relatively 
simple principles of mechanism design to provide a better balance between 
expropriation and holdout.  It accepts the easier path to appraisal rights 
paved by Transkaryotic but tempers the incentives to make outrageous 
claims. 
I have organized the Article as follows.  Part I describes the appraisal 
remedy, focusing in particular on its interplay with modern securities voting 
and settlement practices.  Part II dumps out the puzzle by considering the 
appraisal identity problem from a variety of angles, including the likely 
effects on majority–minority shareholder governance.  Part III finishes by 
considering several normative solutions, including my recommended 
strategy of modified appraisal procedures.  A brief conclusion summarizes 
the arguments. 
I. THE LAW OF APPRAISAL 
A. Background 
Appraisal statutes32 permit minority shareholders to dissent against a 
merger (or related fundamental change)33 and receive the judicially 
 
32  For representative statutes, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 13.02 (2008). 
33  As mentioned, the availability of appraisal differs by jurisdiction.  See supra note 9.  For 
example, Delaware does not grant appraisal rights to minority shareholders during an asset sale.  See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.  Other jurisdictions, such as those following the Model Business 
Corporation Act, do award these rights to shareholders of the selling firm.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 13.02(a)(3).  This inconsistent approach has been known to cause some deal-gaming, where merger 
planners try to sidestep the availability of appraisal rights through jurisdiction shopping and 
recharacterization of the buyer and seller.  See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 27–28, 31 
(Pa. 1958) (finding that the transaction was structured as a minnow-swallows-whale asset purchase of 
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determined fair value of their shares.  The doctrine mushroomed in the early 
1900s,34 when state lawmakers granted appraisal rights to shareholders—
apparently in exchange for an easing of merger voting requirements.35  Prior 
to this change, a corporation was generally prohibited from consummating a 
fundamental transaction, like a merger, without the unanimous consent of 
shareholders.36  This meant, of course, that any single shareholder could 
block the deal, and the expansion of shareholder rosters during this time 
period raised serious holdout problems; for example, gadfly shareholders 
might demand side payments before granting approval.37  The legislative 
response was to replace unanimity with majority or supermajority voting 
requirements.38  But this, in turn, led to concerns that majority owners could 
 
the Delaware firm to avoid appraisal rights for both buying and selling shareholders).  The court rejected 
this structure under the “de facto merger” doctrine, but this doctrine was later reversed in Pennsylvania.  
See Terry v. Penn Cent. Corp., 668 F.2d 188, 192–93 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting the de facto merger 
doctrine in light of legislative amendments to the corporation laws of Pennsylvania). 
34  See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
§ 7.1, at 75 (1976).  Rudimentary appraisal rights apparently existed in Pennsylvania and Ohio as far 
back as the mid-1800s.  Id. 
35  E.g., Thompson, supra note 9, at 11–14 (“Appraisal statutes are often presented as having been 
enacted in tandem with statutes authoring consolidation or merger by less than unanimous vote.”); Barry 
M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE 
L.J. 613, 614, 619 (1998) (“The origin of the appraisal remedy typically is tied to the move in corporate 
law . . . away from a requirement of unanimous shareholder consent.”). 
36  See Thompson, supra note 9, at 11–15; Wertheimer, supra note 35, at 618–19.  The unanimous 
vote requirement presented obvious holdout problems.  See Thompson, supra note 9, at 12–13; see also 
William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 80–82 (“It became increasingly apparent to observers that great benefits 
to society, to the corporation, and derivatively to the rest of the shareholders were sometimes blocked to 
protect interests that seemed quite minor . . . to the remaining shareholders and perhaps to most 
outsiders.”).  Thus, state legislatures began to replace the unanimity requirement with more modest 
voting hurdles in the early 1900s.  See id. at 86–90 (describing the elimination of unanimous shareholder 
voting requirements for some corporate transactions).  Appraisal statutes were enacted, in turn, to 
provide shareholders with an escape hatch from consolidation deals they considered unwise.  See 
Wertheimer, supra note 35, at 619; see also Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 
COLUM. L. REV. 547, 547–48 & n.7 (1927) (cataloging over twenty states that enacted the appraisal 
remedy by 1927).  It is worth noting, however, that appraisal statutes were not always enacted in concert 
with the removal of unanimous shareholder voting requirements.  See Wertheimer, supra note 35, at 619 
n.29.  In some cases, appraisal measures lagged the franchise amendments by ten or twenty years, 
Thompson, supra note 9, at 14–15, casting some doubt on the direct connection between these two 
developments.  See Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 243. 
37  See Thompson, supra note 9, at 12–13. 
38  See Carney, supra note 36, at 94 (“Over the first third of the twentieth century the pattern of 
allowing fundamental changes in all corporations to take place on something less than a unanimous 
shareholder vote became the norm . . . .”); Wertheimer, supra note 35, at 619.  Compare MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT §§ 11.03(e), 12.02(e) (2008) (imposing majority rule for proposed transactions), with VA. 
CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(E) (2010) (requiring two-thirds of shareholders to vote in favor of proposed 
merger transactions). 
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trample over the interests of minority shareholders—say, by merging with 
firms engaged in risky or objectionable activity.39 
Over the ensuing decades, appraisal rights were therefore enacted in 
most jurisdictions as an emergency exit from majority rule.40  A merger 
could move forward with less-than-unanimous approvals, but minority 
owners had an escape if they disliked the shift in direction. 
Unfortunately, most appraisal statutes were riddled with legal 
loopholes, and managers began to exploit these weaknesses to avoid 
appraisal litigation.41  This, combined with a variety of complicated 
procedural prerequisites,42 soon caused the appraisal remedy to fall out of 
academic favor.  The most vocal critic was undoubtedly Bayless Manning, 
a professor at Yale Law School who launched his influential evaluation of 
the remedy in 1962.43  Other commentators similarly derided appraisal as 
riddled with “substantial defects”44 or a “remedy of desperation.”45 
In more recent years, however, the appraisal remedy has been 
rehabilitated as a defense against abusive freezeout mergers by majority 
shareholders.46  These transactions—which made the move to mainstream 
legitimacy in the 1950s and 1960s47—allow majority owners to merge two 
firms into a separate, wholly-owned company by cashing out minority 
shareholders and taking 100% ownership of the new entity.  Assuming 
effective board control, it is easy to secure the necessary approvals: the 
 
39  Thompson, supra note 9, at 12–13. 
40  Id. at 16–17. 
41  One example is the use of an asset sale transaction.  Though the economic result mirrors that of a 
statutory merger, asset sales do not trigger appraisal rights in Delaware.  See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco 
Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).  Another example is the use of triangular mergers, where the 
acquirer conducts its merger through a shell subsidiary in order to take away buyer-side appraisal rights.  
See Terry v. Penn Cent. Corp., 668 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1981) (assessing this type of deal structure and 
concluding that the shareholders of the buying firm do not get appraisal rights because they were not 
entitled to vote on the merger). 
42  See infra Part I.B. 
43  Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE 
L.J. 223 (1962).  Manning’s criticism bites broadly, but his central concern is that firm managers can 
often negate appraisal rights simply by repositioning the deal as an asset sale, reverse merger, or some 
other form-over-substance alchemy.  Id. 
44  Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 830 (1984). 
45  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate 
Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969). 
46  Thompson, supra note 9.  Thompson’s analysis of appraisal cases demonstrates that the focus had 
clearly shifted to freezeout transactions by 1995.  Id. 
47  See Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
624, 648 (1981).  Florida first permitted freezeout mergers in the 1920s, id. at 632, but it was not until 
lawmakers revised the DGCL and the Model Business Corporation Act that these transactions became 
widely accepted, see Subramanian, supra note 19, at 8–9. 
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majority shareholder asks both boards to support the deal and, by definition, 
holds the equity stake needed to vote the transaction through at both firms.48 
While freezeout mergers can promote efficient and desirable 
outcomes,49 they also forge a powerful weapon for majority shareholders 
interested in taking advantage of minority owners.50  Indeed, it should be 
easy to see how a greedy majority controller can underprice the deal to 
instantly steal value from all other owners.  By analogy, I could get a pretty 
good deal on your car if I chose the price at which you sign over the pink 
slip. 
Lawmakers are aware of this problem, of course, and the seminal 
Delaware case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. sought to mitigate the threat of 
abusive freezeouts with renewed appraisal rights.51  Among other reforms, 
Weinberger established appraisal as a primary legal framework for 
checking abusive freezeouts.52  It also replaced an overly formalistic and 
outdated judicial valuation methodology with a more flexible and realistic 
approach.53  These reforms, perhaps combined with an increase in freezeout 
mergers, soon led to a new wave of appraisal proceedings.54  In these cases, 
however, appraisal is rarely invoked as an exit strategy for minority 
shareholders disturbed by the firm’s move into a new line of business. 
 
48  These deals were obviously not possible in the earlier era of unanimous shareholder consent, as 
every minority holder retained a veto over the freezeout.  Moreover, active boards have recently 
increased the complexity of some freezeout negotiations, as the special committees assigned to evaluate 
a deal will sometimes resist the transaction in an attempt to squeeze out a higher price. 
49  But see Subramanian, supra note 19, at 43–44 (describing how existing law may discourage 
efficiency and cost savings from going-private transactions and other potential synergies from related 
deals). 
50  See id. at 31–38. 
51  457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
52  Id. at 704, 715; see also George S. Geis, Internal Poison Pills, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1169, 1190–92 
(2009) (“[T]he court promoted appraisal as the appropriate remedy for unhappy minority 
shareholders.”).  Other legal tools that discourage abusive freezeouts include disclosure obligations and 
fiduciary duty lawsuits.  Id. at 1180–86. 
53  Prior to Weinberger, the courts had adopted the “Delaware block” method of valuation: a 
weighted average of pre-merger market value, capitalized earnings value, and net asset value.  
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712.  The rule had the advantage of relative methodological certainty but was 
ultimately damned with the disadvantage of awarding judgments that bore little resemblance to financial 
reality.  See Geis, supra note 52, at 1190 n.94 (noting that the Weinberger change “should be welcomed 
as promoting accuracy through modern finance”).  Weinberger broke apart the Delaware block with a 
more current legal standard, stating that courts should instead accept “any legitimate valuation 
methodology used by the financial community.”  Id. at 1190 n.94 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713). 
54  The revival of appraisal is easily demonstrated by comparing the work of Joel Seligman with that 
of Robert Thompson.  In 1984, Professor Seligman examined the reported state cases on appraisal for 
the decade prior to Weinberger; he found just nineteen reported decisions.  See Seligman, supra note 44, 
at 829–30 & n.3.  Professor Thompson, conducting a similar empirical analysis for the post-Weinberg 
decade, discovered that the number of appraisal cases had jumped to 103.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 
25.  Furthermore, over 80% of these latter cases involved freezeout mergers.  Id. at 25–26. 
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Rather, it has become a governance “trump card” to counter the threat of 
majority expropriation via freezeout.55 
B. Mechanics 
The appraisal remedy is complicated, and shareholders have to 
navigate a variety of hurdles to perfect their claims.56  Furthermore, the 
rules of the game change frequently57 and can differ considerably among 
jurisdictions.58  A full comparison is beyond the scope of this Article but it 
is worth tracing the basic mechanics for filing a Delaware claim, governed 
by section 262 of the DGCL.  There are two general sets of hurdles: one set 
relates to standing, or the availability of appraisal for a given transaction 
and investor.  The other set of hurdles relates to affirmative duties that 
shareholders must take to perfect appraisal claims when they do enjoy 
standing.  Clearing all obstacles brings the case to a judicial determination 
of fair value. 
To obtain standing,59 a petitioner must satisfy three requirements.  
First, the disputed transaction must qualify for appraisal (i.e., the shares are 
being acquired through a statutory merger, short form merger, or other 
covered transaction).60  This inquiry is sometimes gamed; as mentioned 
above, firms can employ creative deal structures to avoid appraisal claims 
during conventional mergers.61  Objecting shareholders will usually have a 
chance to assert appraisal, however, if they are being forced out through a 
freezeout merger.62  Second, the petitioner must be a record stockholder 
 
55  The problems related to majority expropriation are discussed further infra Part II.C. 
56  See infra notes 59–70 and accompanying text. 
57  For example, Delaware has amended its statute approximately thirty-five times.  The most recent 
amendments include 77 Del. Laws 4 §§ 12–13 (2009), 76 Del. Laws 203 §§ 11–16 (2007), 73 Del. Laws 
231 § 21 (2001), 71 Del. Laws 873 §§ 49–52 (1998), 71 Del. Laws 233 § 15 (1997), 70 Del. Laws 777 § 
22 (1996), 70 Del. Laws 711 §§ 2–3 (1996), 70 Del. Laws 186 § 1 (1995), 70 Del. Laws 121 § 16 
(1995), 69 Del. Laws 523 §§ 1–9 (1994), 69 Del. Laws 54–55 § 10 (1993).  For a listing of twenty-three 
earlier amendments to the statute (since adoption in 1899), see Calio, supra note 16, at 13 n.46. 
58  Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (2008) (differing from Delaware on appraisal 
triggers, the timing of appraisal payment, allocation of court costs, and application of the market-out 
exception), with 15 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1578 (West 1995) (containing similar differences from 
Delaware).  For a helpful analysis of the differences between the DGCL and the Model Business 
Corporation Act, see Mary Siegel, An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal 
Rights Provisions, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231 (2011).  
59  I use “standing” only to denote the availability of appraisal rights; it should not be confused with 
procedural or constitutional concepts of standing. 
60  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2010). 
61  See supra notes 33, 41. 
62  This is true because a majority controller typically uses a freezeout merger to capture 100% 
ownership of the firm—either through a long-form statutory merger or through a tender offer followed 
by a short form merger.  Appraisal is available to the dissenter in either case.  For a more detailed 
description of the differences (both strategic and legal) between statutory merger and tender offer 
freezeouts, see Geis, supra note 52, at 1182–85; Subramanian, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
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who owns the shares when an appraisal demand is made and holds this 
position continuously through the effective date of the merger.63  This 
requirement to act through a record holder has been strictly interpreted in 
Delaware, and some beneficial owners—who typically instruct their record 
holder to assert appraisal on their behalf—have even lost their appraisal 
rights when the record holder fails to take action.64  Third, the petitioner 
must avoid a “market-out exception,” which revokes appraisal rights when 
the merger consideration consists of reasonably liquid equity securities—
stock listed on a national securities exchange or held by more than 2000 
record owners.65  The justification here is that appraisal proceedings are a 
waste of time if dissenters preserve their equity position while still enjoying 
an exit option via public sale.  Importantly, however, dissenters maintain 
appraisal rights in Delaware when cash is used for the merger 
consideration—even if the shares trade publicly prior to the transaction.66 
After meeting the standing requirements, the petitioner faces a second 
flight of hurdles.  This time she must take several affirmative steps to 
perfect the appraisal claim.  First, the petitioner must deliver a written 
appraisal demand (again conducted through the record holder) to the 
corporation, prior to the merger vote.67  The demand is a simple statement 
containing the stockholder’s identity and a notification that she intends to 
 
63  § 262(a). 
64  See, e.g., Bandell v. TC/GP, Inc., No. 247, 1995, 1996 WL 69789, at *1 (Del. Jan. 26, 1996) 
(dismissing petition for appraisal filed by a beneficial owner when the record owner was not a party to 
the petition and beneficial owner did not present evidence establishing his status as record owner—even 
though the record owner had “submitted a pre-merger demand for appraisal” on behalf of the beneficial 
owner); In re Enstar Corp. v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351, 1355–56 (Del. 1987) (denying appraisal rights to a 
beneficial owner who filed a direct appraisal demand instead of working through the record holder); 
Edgerly v. Hechinger, No. C.A. 16138-NC, 1998 WL 671241, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1998) 
(dismissing appraisal action filed by a beneficial owner against the company where a broker filed a 
demand for appraisal because the broker was not the record holder and the broker failed to instruct the 
record holder to demand appraisal); Tabbi v. Pollution Control Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 867, 871–73 (Del. 
Ch. 1986) (denying appraisal rights to persons who were not record shareholders on the merger date).  
This strict approach is apparently justified as providing greater certainty and fairness for the firm 
managers.  A recent case, however, throws some uncertainty on the Delaware Chancery Court’s 
willingness to adhere to a literal reading of this requirement.  See Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140 (Del. 
Ch. 2010) (looking through the record holder to the actions of lower intermediaries in a non-appraisal 
context).  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed in part and labeled this part of the opinion as 
dicta without precedential effect.  See Crown EMAK Partners v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 398 (Del. 2010).  
The Model Business Corporations Act is less formal, allowing beneficial owners to seek appraisal rights 
without the consent of a record owner.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.03 (2008). 
65  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1). 
66  Id. § 262(b)(2). 
67  Id. § 262(d)(1).  Again, only a record holder may pursue appraisal rights.  Id.  The exact 
mechanics are slightly more complicated.  If the transaction qualifies for appraisal rights, then the firm 
must notify shareholders of appraisal rights at least twenty days prior to the shareholders’ meeting.  Id.  
Dissenting stockholders must then deliver their appraisal demand to the firm prior to the vote on the 
merger.  Id. 
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pursue appraisal for a given number of shares.68  This may seem like a 
bureaucratic formality, but it is an independent requirement: a proxy or vote 
against the merger will not satisfy the written demand requirement.69  
Second, the petitioner must vote against the merger or abstain from the 
vote.70  Finally, she must file a petition requesting appraisal proceedings 
with the Delaware Chancery Court within 120 days of the effective merger 
date.71  Importantly, each dissenting shareholder must file her own lawsuit 
in Delaware; there are no provisions that automatically require litigants to 
share legal expenses via class action proceedings.72 
If every requirement is satisfied, the lawsuit can proceed, and a court 
will determine and award the fair value of the stock to the dissenter.  Each 
side submits a valuation and bears the burden of proving claims by a 
preponderance of the evidence.73  If no one meets this burden, as is 
commonly the case, the court will step in and use its own judgment to 
determine fair value.74  Unfortunately for the petitioners, it is possible for 
courts to award a lower price for the stock than the merger consideration 
provided.75  Also, time is rarely on the petitioner’s side: it can take years to 
determine the fair value of disputed stock.76  During this period the dissenter 
may not close out her position, receives no dividends, and forfeits 
subsequent capital gains,77 though a recent amendment does award the 
 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. § 262(a).  It is also worth noting that this requirement is a central factor in the identity puzzle 
discussed in this Article.  As described infra Part II.A, it can often be difficult to determine how a 
previous owner voted when shares are purchased after the record date but prior to the merger vote.  For 
all practical purposes, however, a petitioner may be able to sidestep this nonfavorable voting 
requirement much of the time under the recent Transkaryotic precedent.  See supra notes 12–17 and 
accompanying text. 
71  § 262(e).  A dissenting shareholder is also free, however, to change her mind and accept the 
merger terms as long as she does so within sixty days of the effective merger date.  Id. 
72  Id.; see also id. § 262(j) (providing that any shareholder may specifically request a judicial order 
to share appraisal expenses among all shareholders who opted into a proceeding). 
73  See, e.g., M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 1999). 
74  There are many examples of judicial adjustments to appraisal valuation models.  See, e.g., Global 
GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 498–99 (Del. Ch. 2010); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990). 
75  See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 141–42 (Del. 2009); Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 
A.2d 305, 309 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
76  See, e.g., Jesse A. Finkelstein & Russell C. Silberglied, Technicolor IV: Appraisal Valuation in a 
Two-Step Merger, 52 BUS. LAW. 801 (1997) (describing the long saga of appraisal litigation prompted 
by the acquisition of Technicolor). 
77  Delaware does have a limited sharing rule that allows dissenters to claim “elements of future 
value . . . known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of speculation.”  
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).  To this extent, private information 
available at the merger date but not yet translating into price gains may be included in recovery models.  
This rule has, however, faced some criticism from commentators.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & 
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petitioner meaningful interest payments on any ultimate judgment.78  
Perhaps worse than this long path to judgment, however, is the 
unpredictable and costly battle of the experts, typically modified by some 
judicial tinkering, that forms the basis for the ultimate fair price valuation.79 
C. Quasi-Appraisal 
Before turning to the identity puzzle, it is helpful to discuss one last riff 
on the appraisal theme.  As mentioned above, appraisal serves as the 
primary legal countermeasure to abusive freezeout mergers.80  Indeed, in a 
short form merger—where minority holders can be cashed out without a 
vote if the controller owns at least 90% of the firm81—Delaware courts have 
recently stated that appraisal is the exclusive remedy for disgruntled 
shareholders.82  But this assumes that the firm does not engage in fraud or 
illegality and that the firm discloses the facts necessary for a dissenter to 
decide whether to accept the deal or to seek appraisal.83  What happens if 
the controller lies or leaves out important information related to the deal or 
the firm’s economic prospects?  It is difficult to unscramble the eggs here, 
because, under the DGCL, a short form merger becomes effective before 
any disclosures are made to minority shareholders.84 
The judicial response has been to craft something called “quasi-
appraisal”: a legal valuation process that85 attempts to “mirror as best as 
possible the statutory appraisal remedy”86 when minority holders are 
hindered from exercising their traditional rights.87  Yet working out the 
 
Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119 
(2005). 
78  Historically, interest payments on appraisal judgments were messy, with petitioners sometimes 
receiving only simple interest.  See Thompson, supra note 9, at 42 & n.182.  In 2007, however, the 
Delaware statute was modified to pay the Federal Reserve Discount Rate plus 5%, compounded 
quarterly, for the period running from the date of the merger through the payment of the judgment 
(though the court reserves the discretion to use a different rate).  See 76 Del. Laws 203 § 14 (2007) 
(codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2010)). 
79  See, e.g., Finkelstein & Silberglied, supra note 76 (illustrating both the challenges of performing 
appraisal valuation and the judicial judgment required to assess competing claims in a notorious 
appraisal saga).  In this context, one additional benefit of my proposed revisions to the appraisal process 
might be faster and more certain relief for meritorious claims.  See infra Part III.C. 
80  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
81  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (describing short form mergers). 
82  See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001). 
83  Id. 
84  See § 253; Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 134–35 (Del. 2009) (providing the requirements 
of the “short form merger statute” under section 253 of the DGCL). 
85  See Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 311 (Del. Ch. 2005) (describing the origins of 
quasi-appraisal). 
86  Berger, 976 A.2d at 137. 
87  Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 311. 
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details of quasi-appraisal has proved tricky.88  Obviously, if there has been 
fraud or a nondisclosure problem with the short form merger materials, then 
the firm should be required to correct this deficiency.  And the actual 
litigants will have their usual battle of the experts to determine whether the 
freezeout price was fair.  But should all minority shareholders be eligible 
for a judgment if the consideration is indeed found wanting, or should the 
remedy be available only to those who opt in to a lawsuit?  And should the 
dissenters be required to repay the firm (perhaps even placing some of the 
already-paid funds from the freezeout into escrow during litigation) if the 
court’s determination of fair value falls below the deal price?  After all, in a 
normal appraisal proceeding, petitioners do face the risk of receiving less 
than the merger consideration.89 
In the recent case of Berger v. Pubco Corp.,90 the Delaware Supreme 
Court wrestled with these exact issues.  Citing “considerations of utility and 
fairness,”91 the court held that all minority shareholders would automatically 
become members of a class that was eligible to receive any resulting 
increase in price through quasi-appraisal.92  Furthermore, the minority 
holders were not obligated to escrow any portion of the merger 
consideration.93  The upshot of this decision, then, is that the quasi-appraisal 
road looks much smoother than the appraisal road—and the litigation risk 
accompanying short form mergers has likely increased.94  But because the 
quasi-appraisal door opens only through fraud or faulty disclosures, the real 
effect is likely to be longer and more complete information releases at the 
time of the freezeout. 
For our purposes, however, quasi-appraisal is interesting for a different 
reason.  In Berger, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized the practical 
need to toss out the formal requirement that beneficial shareholders act 
through the record owners: 
[T]he court will not require beneficial or “street name” owners to “demand” 
 
88  See Berger, 976 A.2d 132. 
89  Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 309.  This is true because some courts may ultimately determine that the 
fair value of the stock is less than the merger consideration.  If so, a petitioner will receive this lower 
amount (adjusted for interest) and cannot take the earlier deal that was offered.  Other minority 
shareholders who simply cashed their checks and did not pursue an appraisal claim are, of course, 
unaffected by this subsequent judicial determination of a lower fair price for the stock. 
90  976 A.2d 132. 
91  Id. at 142. 
92  Id. at 143. 
93  Id. at 144.  This decision reversed the earlier Gilliland case, which required that minority 
shareholders both opt in and establish an escrow account replicating the traditional appraisal 
requirements.  See Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 313.  
94  This is true because an automatic class plus no escrow requirements make it much easier for 
plaintiffs to gain the scale needed to pursue the claim.  Recall that normal appraisal proceedings do not 
typically allow for class action proceedings; rather, a qualifying shareholder must take affirmative action 
to join a demand suit.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)–(e). 
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quasi-appraisal through their record holder.  The court is concerned that, given 
the substantial passage of time since the merger, it would be difficult for 
stockholders to secure the cooperation of the former record holders or 
nominees needed to perfect demand in accordance with the statute.  Instead, 
stockholders seeking [quasi-appraisal] will need to provide only proof of 
beneficial ownership of [their] shares on the merger date.95 
This is an intriguing approach, especially given Delaware’s strict view 
on the need for shareholders to act through a record holder during 
traditional appraisal proceedings.  It also hints at the difficulties involved in 
reconciling anachronistic appraisal laws with the realities of modern 
securities exchange.  To understand these complexities, we must now trace 
two important developments in the financial markets. 
D. Developments 
First, settlement and clearing procedures for stock trades have become 
much more complex—to the point where some parts of the appraisal 
remedy make little sense.  Second, temporal delays are leading to a 
decoupling of vested franchise rights and economic ownership—a 
phenomenon that has been called “empty voting” in the corporate law 
literature.96  Taken together, these events, along with the recent Delaware 
holding in Transkaryotic, have opened the door to a significant 
amplification of appraisal economics. 
1. Modern Stock Settlement and Clearing Procedures.—When 
lawmakers first enacted appraisal rights a hundred years ago, investors lived 
in a paper world.  Numbered stock certificates were typically passed from 
buyer to seller like the deed to a house or title to a car.97  This soon raised a 
problem, however, because shares of IBM and other large companies trade 
hands much more frequently than old Cutlass Supremes.98  Starting in the 
1960s, the system began to buckle under the immense volume of stock 
trading on the NYSE and other exchanges.99  It got so bad that, for a time, 
the markets were closed every Wednesday so the unruly piles of certificates 
could be inspected for authenticity, organized, and forwarded to the correct 
owners.100 
 
95  Berger, 976 A.2d at 141 (second alteration in original) (quoting Gilliland, 873 A.2d at 313). 
96  See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
97  See WILLIAM T. DENTZER, JR., THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY: DTC’S FORMATIVE YEARS 
AND CREATION OF THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION (DTCC) 1–2 (2008) (noting the 
problems caused by the “paperwork crisis”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1237 & n.48 (same). 
98  See DENTZER, supra note 97, at 1–6. 
99  Id. at 1; Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1237 n.48. 
100  See DENTZER, supra note 97, at 1; History of New York Stock Exchange Holidays, NYSE.COM, 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/closings.pdf (Jan. 2011) (describing periodic closings due to “back office 
work load” and Wednesday closings from June to December of 1968). 
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This would not do, and eventually traders settled on a fix.  A central 
entity was set up to replace the network of messengers scurrying across the 
back alleys of Wall Street with stock certificates and cashier’s checks.101  
This entity, the Depository Trust Company (DTC), began to serve as record 
owner for a huge majority of the shares.102  Certificates were physically 
housed in DTC warehouses, and the name on the shares no longer changed 
with every sale: the DTC took record ownership in the nominee name, Cede 
& Co.103  Instead of physically transferring stock certificates, the 
clearinghouse simply transferred beneficial ownership from seller to buyer, 
electronically, through bookkeeping changes.104  Economically, everything 
seemed the same: beneficial owners continued to receive information on 
their holdings and could exercise shareholder rights either through their 
broker or through the DTC.105  This setup was a kludge, but it worked.  The 
DTC and its affiliated entities now settle and clear more than $1.86 
quadrillion in securities transactions and payments each year.106 
This transformation of back-office exchange procedures, however, has 
also altered some fundamental features of corporate governance in a way 
that is only beginning to receive sustained attention.107  It is now much 
harder, for example, to match most buyers and sellers to specifically 
identifiable certificates.  Indeed, the DTC often does not even try: it holds 
most of its stock as unidentified “fungible bulk.”108  When I buy, say, 100 
shares of Apple Computer, the DTC simply works with broker-dealers to 
debit and credit the right accounts.  But it is meaningless to say that my 
shares were purchased from a specific seller when the average daily volume 
of Apple stock exceeds 33 million shares. 
In most cases, this doesn’t really matter.  Who cares if my shares of 
Apple came from Steve Jobs or Bill Gates?  Yet, as I will explain, this use 
of central record holders and anonymous exchange is partially responsible 
for rendering a key procedural requirement of appraisal statutes 
 
101  DENTZER, supra note 97, at 11–16 (describing the formation of this central depository). 
102  Id. at 13.  For public firms, approximately 70%–80% of shares are now held through the DTC 
and other nominees.  Exchange Act Release No. 34,384, 06 SEC Docket 231, at 232 n.5 (Mar. 14, 
1997). 
103  DENTZER, supra note 97, at 12. 
104  Id. at 13.  This is a slight simplification, as there may be several layers of custodians between the 
DTC and the economic owner.  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1238–40.  For excellent resources 
on the complicated plumbing that supports the settlement and clearing process, or the back-office 
exchange of securities following a sale, see generally VIRGINIA B. MORRIS & STUART Z. GOLDSTEIN, 
GUIDE TO CLEARANCE & SETTLEMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO  DTCC (2009); DAVID M. WEISS, AFTER 
THE TRADE IS MADE: PROCESSING SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS (2d rev. ed. 2006). 
105  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1238–40. 
106  DENTZER, supra note 97, at x. 
107  See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1248–49.  For additional details on the series of 
complex corporate “voting pathologies” brought on by modern trading practices, see id. at 1248–70. 
108  Id. at 1239–40. 
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incoherent.109  But first, consider another problem: how should firms assign 
and freeze voting rights in an ever-churning river of stock trades? 
2. Temporal Decoupling of Franchise Rights from Economic 
Interest.—Our mental model of corporate governance envisions a 
steady body of shareholders who receive statements outlining the key issues 
on a forthcoming ballot, muster the information necessary to make sound 
decisions, and eventually cast their votes by proxy cards or at a 
shareholders’ meeting.110  In actuality, however, we do not live in such a 
stable world.  Think back to Apple Computer.  With roughly 15 million 
shares trading hands on the average day,111 how can we ever freeze events 
long enough to send the ballot, deliberate, and cast votes?  Time presses 
forward, and the linking of corporate voting rights to shares of stock raises 
administrative concerns different from those presented by our relatively 
stable political franchise of one person, one vote.112 
The typical solution is to set a bright-line record date, at which time 
franchise rights attach to current owners even if they sell the shares before 
the day of the actual vote.113  This gives a firm time to send out the ballots, 
distribute key data, and collect the votes.  The same “snapshot” approach is 
taken with dividends: shareholders enjoy the right to receive payments and 
the shares trade ex-dividend long before checks are ever cut.114  This system 
 
109  See infra Part II.A. 
110  See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2008) (describing the intricacies of corporate governance); JONATHAN R. MACEY, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN (2008) (detailing the fundamentals of 
corporate governance as an institution and suggesting the most effective mechanisms for corporate 
management). 
111  See, e.g., Edward Krudy, Apple Shares Briefly Slump as Volume Spikes, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 
2011, 6:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/10/us-apple-stock-drop-
idUSTRE7196UG20110210. 
112  However, notorious balloting scandals suggest that, even in politics, voting may not always be 
so simple.  See, e.g., David Greenberg, Was Nixon Robbed?, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2000, 9:30 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2000/10/was_nixon_robbed.single.html 
(describing the nasty fights surrounding the 1960 presidential election). 
113  The DGCL is illustrative.  Under section 213(a), a record date not “more than 60 nor less than 
10 days before the date of such meeting” establishes the roster of eligible voters.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 213(a) (2010).  There is some dispute over the extent to which an after-record-date purchaser may 
claw back the right to vote on the transaction by securing an irrevocable proxy from the selling 
shareholder in addition to economic ownership.  To the extent that such vote clawbacks are available, 
this would suggest that the appraisal puzzle might be solved—at least clumsily—by requiring dissenting 
shareholders to secure these irrevocable proxies.  It does not seem, however, that these clawbacks are 
common or easy to administer, and Delaware rejected such a solution (at least implicitly) in the 
Transkaryotic decision.  See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 
2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
114  See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 392–402 (10th ed. 2011). 
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seems to work fine for economic matters, as share prices simply drop to 
reflect the severance of a dividend from the stock.115 
But delays between the vesting of voting rights on the record date and 
the time of the actual vote at the shareholders’ meeting can introduce 
intractable complications for firms with rapid share turnover.  A series of 
articles by Bernard Black and Henry Hu coins the term “empty voting” for 
situations where an actor retains franchise rights without economic 
interest.116  When combined with the centralized settlement framework 
described above, empty voting throws a monkey wrench into appraisal 
statutes.117  The easiest way to understand how significantly these 
developments confound appraisal is to return to Transkaryotic. 
II. DUMPING OUT THE IDENTITY PUZZLE 
A. Transkaryotic 
The question in Transkaryotic can be stated simply: should we allow 
investors who purchase shares without a vote on the merger, because the 
record date has passed, to receive appraisal rights even though they did not 
personally comply with Delaware’s procedural requirement to abstain or 
vote against the deal?118  It should be clear by now that this problem arises 
only because of the confluence of modern settlement practices and the 
temporal decoupling of franchise rights from economic ownership.  If, 
counterfactually, all shares were identified and tracked through a unique 
serial number, then it would be easy to look back at how each specifically 
identified share was actually voted to determine whether it was eligible for 
appraisal.  In such a world, the Transkaryotic problem would not exist, even 
 
115  Id. 
116  E.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic 
and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007) 
[hereinafter Hu & Black, Hedge Funds]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty 
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, 
The New Vote Buying].  The authors explore a variety of concerns related to empty voting and corporate 
governance, most of which are beyond the scope of this article.  It is also important to note that empty 
voting can arise through other means as well, such as when shareholders use derivatives to hedge away 
the economic effects of ownership while retaining the franchise.  See, e.g., Shaun Martin & Frank 
Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775. 
117  Hu and Black do briefly mention Transkaryotic in one of their articles—describing the 
possibility of hedging out economic ownership while maintaining an “empty appraisal” claim.  See 
Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and 
Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 723–24 (2008).  Unlike Hu and Black, my analysis focuses on the 
impact of amplified appraisal claims through loosened voting requirements—and not on the possibility 
that economic ownership might also be hedged out while retaining appraisal rights.  Of course, this 
phenomenon would also be curtailed by my modified appraisal proposal, as even an empty economic 
owner would face reduced incentives (through the embedded option requirement) to insist on outrageous 
appraisal terms.  See infra Part III.C. 
118  This nonfavorable voting requirement is discussed supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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with our system of delayed franchise.  Likewise, if there were no need to 
delay the vote—perhaps because of some technological advance allowing 
shareholders to instantaneously receive information and vote shares—then 
it would not matter that the DTC holds physical shares in fungible bulk.  
Like the quasi-appraisal proceedings discussed above,119 beneficial 
shareholders could simply state how they actually voted on the merger.120  
The problem of linking a voting record to a generalized pool of shares only 
arises, then, with both of the developments described above. 
Recall that the chancery court’s response in Transkaryotic was simply 
to look past the problem and concentrate on the record holder, Cede.121  As 
long as enough shares qualify for appraisal—because Cede does not vote 
these shares for the deal—then appraisal claims can go forward by 
beneficial owners who, not having personally instructed Cede on the vote, 
otherwise comply with the legal requirements.122  This solution is clearly 
consistent with the formal language of the statute.123  It is also simple, 
practical, and in harmony with Delaware’s past focus on the record holder 
as exclusive agent for asserting appraisal claims.124  But it raises the stakes 
of litigation significantly and opens the door to amplified appraisal claims.  
This development should also make us pause to ask whether there may be 
some better way to meet the underlying goal of managing governance 
tensions between majority and minority shareholders. 
B. Amplified Appraisal Claims 
Imagine that you manage a hedge fund or a university endowment.  
Your coffers are dwindling, and you need a good way to eke out decent 
returns in these choppy economic times.  Does anything suggest itself in 
light of Transkaryotic?  One emerging possibility is to mount what I will 
call an “amplified appraisal strategy” to squeeze money from freezeout, or 
perhaps even conventional, mergers. 
Here is how the game is played.  You instruct your loyal staff to keep 
abreast of merger or takeover announcements related to Delaware firms 
(and possibly elsewhere if you think other jurisdictions will follow suit).  
Then, you monitor the buzz on each deal.  If a transaction is awful, such 
 
119  See supra Part I.C. 
120  Instantaneous voting would raise a different problem under Delaware appraisal law, however, as 
the statute requires a firm to notify shareholders of their right to pursue appraisal at least twenty days 
prior to the actual merger vote.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.  Stated differently, instantaneous voting 
makes little sense because shareholders need time to process and to evaluate the information related to 
the proposed transaction. 
121  In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at 
*3–4 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
122  Id. 
123  Recall that section 262 of the DGCL focuses only on the record holder, without any mention of 
beneficial owners.  § 262. 
124  See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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that a majority of shareholders will likely vote it down, you may as well put 
that deal aside.  It does you no good, because appraisal rights will only 
attach if the merger goes through.125  This is why freezeout mergers are 
attractive, as the probability of approval is great.  Yet, perhaps ironically, 
you also want to avoid transactions that are highly attractive and likely to 
merit an overwhelmingly positive vote.  There may not be enough shares to 
piggyback on down the road because every ‘yes’ vote negates appraisal 
rights.126 
The fun starts, then, when you find a deal in that sweet middle ground 
between pessimism and popularity.  Your hand is also stronger when you 
can reasonably claim that the merger undervalues the target: it is more 
difficult to argue inadequacy if a buyout offer doubles or triples recent share 
prices.127  The next step is to assemble a meaningful minority position in the 
target firm, any time before the date of the shareholders’ meeting, to 
threaten an amplified appraisal claim.  If, for example, you expect 
shareholders of a target firm to collectively vote 70% of the shares for the 
merger, then you can certainly buy 5%–10% of the stock and raise the 
threat of an appraisal claim.  The firm may just pay you off to avoid the 
expense and the bad press of a sustained appraisal campaign.  If not, then 
you still have enough of an economic position to make the appraisal suit 
plausible.  In short, you have magnified your legal claim by buying into an 
appraisal class ex post, after voting rights are lost.128 
In this manner, Transkaryotic finesses a key historical limitation of 
appraisal statutes.  As described earlier, these rights were often unappealing 
because dissenting shareholders could not mount a class action lawsuit; 
each plaintiff had to finance the costs of litigation.129  Unless the dissenter 
held a sizeable block of shares—or a majority owner was trying to cram 
down a particularly odorous deal—this effort was not worth it.130  Now, 
however, strategic investors can buy shares up to the last minute without 
worrying about how to link specific stock to a negative vote by the sellers 
 
125  § 262. 
126  Id.  Due to voter apathy, however, this is unlikely to present much of a practical problem.  Even 
in high-profile merger transactions, a sizeable percentage of shares are never voted.  See supra note 110.  
Because the DGCL does not require the shares to be voted “no” to perfect appraisal—only that they not 
be voted “yes”—there is almost always a meaningful pool of qualified shares for appraisal speculators to 
draw upon.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
127  It is possible, however, that with a host of valuation methodologies, accommodating Delaware 
case law, and eager expert witnesses, an aggressive plaintiff may have room to argue for more.  After 
all, if we put aside a “winner’s curse” theory and do not assume that acquirers tend to overpay, acquiring 
firms may frequently attempt to leave some room for profits from the deal. 
128  Moreover, with willing credit markets, it may be possible to buy these shares with heavy debt 
financing—a leveraged, amplified appraisal play, if you will. 
129  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
130  This is probably why early fears that appraisal rights would lead to strike suits did not seem to 
materialize.  See, e.g., Manning, supra note 43, at 238 (warning that appraisal rights might cause 
minority shareholders to pursue false litigation). 
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retaining approval rights on the merger.131  This development may not help 
the selling shareholders much, unless the possibility of an amplified 
appraisal upside is reflected in their sale price.132  But it could 
fundamentally change the nature of appraisal from a weak protection for 
preexisting shareholders to a “live play” for post-announcement investors.133  
Any well-capitalized actor might now put enough skin in the game to make 
the costs of an appraisal claim, or the threat of incurring these costs if the 
firm will not accede to “greenmail,”134 plausible. 
Indeed, the appraisal puzzle may become amplified in an additional 
sense.  The strategy is not that hard to comprehend.  What happens if 
multiple groups of appraisal investors put in parallel claims, each seizing 
upon the same qualified shares of Cede to support their position?  Imagine, 
for example, that a popular merger eventually receives a 90% approval 
vote.135  Zero shares vote against the merger, and the other 10% of shares 
are simply not voted.  Suppose also that, following common practice, half 
of the target shareholders sell their stock “on the news”—after the record 
date but before the shareholders’ meeting.136  It is entirely possible that five 
different appraisal investors might each buy 10% of the stock, claiming it 
was “their” 10% that went unvoted by Cede.  How could a Delaware court 
possibly deal with this?  Certainly half of the shares cannot be eligible for 
 
131  This is a meaningful change because the record date is often set many weeks prior to the actual 
vote, and new information will often emerge between the record date and the shareholders’ meeting.  
The emerging facts of Transkaryotic and the subsequent actions of Carl Icahn are a perfect example of 
this possibility.  See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text. 
132  This becomes a distinct possibility if multiple parties decide to pursue an amplified appraisal 
strategy and the share price is bid up to reflect the possibility of a higher appraisal valuation.  This 
relates to the idea of amplified appraisal as a back-end check on the market for corporate control, 
discussed infra Part III.A.  But the market’s tendency to incorporate information into prices as soon as 
possible means that the listing price may jump quickly to reflect future purchases used to amplify 
appraisal. 
133  To be sure, the acquiring firm may protect against this possibility by conditioning the merger 
agreement on receiving less than a certain percentage of appraisal claims.  It is easy to write a contract 
granting the acquiring party an out if, say, more than 5% or 10% of shareholders seek appraisal rights.  
See Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 242.  These clauses were common historically, but seem to 
have died out in recent years.  See M&A Deal Commentary: Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New 
Hedge Fund Strategy?, LATHAM & WATKINS (May 2007), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/
pub1883_1.pdf. 
134  Greenmail is the repurchase of a private block of shares from a gadfly investor by the company 
for a premium over current prices.  It is not a terribly effective entrenchment strategy (because another 
investor might reassemble an ownership toehold), but was deemed legally permissible in the well-known 
Delaware case of Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
135  Such an overwhelming voter turnout is fantasy in today’s age of rational voter apathy, and it is 
unlikely that even the most popular mergers would garner such approval.  This is especially true under 
the example’s assumption that many shareholders sell on the news—only the most dedicated corporate 
governance pundit will bother to cast votes for a merger of a firm she no longer owns. 
136  Shareholders frequently sell their stock to arbitrageurs after a merger is announced but before it 
is consummated.  It is possible, of course, that they might sell prior to the record date—thus also 
transferring the vote—but this is less interesting for our purposes. 
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appraisal when the merger was approved by 90% of the stock.  But no 
petition can be dismissed.  The framework established by Transkaryotic 
makes each claim individually colorable, but collectively asinine.137  Should 
the court invalidate all appraisal claims?  Prorate them among the 
petitioners?  Make Cede figure it out and deal with the consequences?  
There is no principled way to proceed. 
The key question, of course, is whether amplified appraisal claims 
would, on balance, improve or distort the governance relationship between 
majority and minority shareholders.  As is often the case, there are 
competing theoretical arguments. 
C. Reorienting the Majority–Minority Shareholder Relationship 
Majority shareholders have many strategies for fleecing minority 
owners.  They might, for example, exert influence over the board of 
directors to receive a plum management position or to secure favorable 
terms on a supply contract.138  Or they might sell a block of shares to a third 
party at a price above prevailing market value to capitalize the future 
benefits of control.139  But the most potent way for a majority owner to 
expropriate value is simply to conduct a freezeout merger and take 100% 
ownership of the firm.140  Because the majority shareholder chooses the 
buyout price, every dollar below fair value flows directly from the minority 
owners’ ledgers to that of the controlling shareholder.  Without adequate 
regulatory safeguards, the controller also has power over the timing of the 
offer, essentially enjoying a perpetual call option on the entire firm. 
For this reason, an overly permissive freezeout regime will 
theoretically reduce the market value of firms that have controlling 
shareholders.  Potential investors are haunted by the constant fear of an 
abusive freezeout.  That risk should, in turn, depress the upfront price that 
investors are willing to pay for stock.141  A possible response, of course, is 
simply to splinter the majority ownership position into smaller holdings, 
thereby dissipating the risk of abusive freezeouts and driving up the total 
 
137  The problem was only avoided in Transkaryotic because the collective demand for appraisal 
rights was still less than the eligible shares held by Cede (12 million shares versus 17 million shares).  
But the respondents astutely recognized this potential oversubscription problem and used it to argue 
against the court’s ultimate decision to allow appraisal.  Opening Brief in Support of Respondent’s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
138  See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Doctrines and Markets: Controlling Controlling 
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 787–88 (2003). 
139  See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979) (“[I]t has long been 
settled law that, absent looting of corporate assets, conversion of a corporate opportunity, fraud or other 
acts of bad faith, a controlling stockholder is free to sell, and a purchaser is free to buy, that controlling 
interest at a premium price . . . .”). 
140  See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 138. 
141  See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 875, 880. 
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market capitalization of the firm.  But this is a ham-fisted solution, 
especially because concentrated ownership may be quite beneficial—in 
some contexts—as a strategy for checking the agency cost problem between 
owners and managers.142  Consequently, corporate law might play a 
meaningful role in enhancing firm value by policing freezeout mergers in a 
more nuanced and creative manner. 
One legal approach is simply to prevent or limit a controlling 
shareholder’s ability to conduct freezeout mergers.  This was the strategy 
taken in Delaware for a short period of time: from 1977 to 1983, the court 
required majority owners to demonstrate that a freezeout merger would 
serve a “valid business purpose.”143  In other words, naked plots to take over 
the firm were forbidden.  Yet this sort of standard is exceptionally difficult 
to administer, and the business purpose rule was quite sensibly abandoned144 
as it became clear that managers and their hired experts could easily 
fabricate some business purpose for the deal if that is what the law 
required.145 
A second legal approach could require unanimous shareholder 
approval for freezeout mergers.  After all, why should the majority 
controller have the right to set the price at which a minority owner must sell 
his property?  But assigning this much power to minority shareholders can 
lead to a holdout problem whereby recalcitrant dissenters demand private 
tribute before blessing the merger.  Not all freezeout transactions amount to 
legally sanctioned theft.  It is important to recognize that there are 
 
142  This is discussed in the blockholder literature, which shows how a controlling shareholder can 
mitigate free-rider effects that undermine the monitoring of management.  Simply stated, large owners 
will have greater incentives to prevent bad managerial decisions, and all shareholders can benefit from 
this vigilance.  See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 
(1990); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 
79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991). 
143  See Roland Int’l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1037 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. Int’l Gen. Indus., 
Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124–25 (Del. 1977); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). 
144  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (“In view of the fairness test which has 
long been applicable to parent-subsidiary mergers, the expanded appraisal remedy now available to 
shareholders, and the broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion such relief as the facts of a given case 
may dictate, we do not believe that any additional meaningful protection is afforded minority 
shareholders by the business purpose requirement . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
145  One simple possibility that comes to mind is that a going-private freezeout might allow firms to 
save the costs of making the ongoing disclosures required of public companies under federal securities 
laws.  Or perhaps the transaction would “smooth governance tensions” and allow business decisions to 
be reached more efficiently.  Humans are quite adept at offering a business justification for their 
decisions when this will benefit their personal accounts.  This can be seen in another context by 
examining the legal requirements for expense reimbursements in corporate proxy contests: when the law 
requires competing slates of directors to invoke matters of policy (rather than just matters of personality) 
before personal reimbursement is permitted, these parties have an uncanny ability to justify their board 
aspirations in terms of business disputes.  See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 
N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955). 
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legitimate reasons to conduct these deals,146 and excessive minority 
blocking power via an express veto may destroy social welfare by 
obstructing efficient results.147  Furthermore, this prompts the question of 
what a shareholder’s property rights in the stock really entail; one could 
make the case that elimination of the unanimous voting requirement for 
mergers in the early 1900s148 should be understood as an important 
qualification to shareholder property rights.149  In other words, investors buy 
shares subject to a wide variety of governance constraints, one of which is 
that mergers can be implemented by majority rule.  Of course, this does not 
mean that such a framework must be frozen in time.  Rather, the real 
question is what set of legal rules will foster the best outcomes. 
The dilemma is plain.  Overly permissive freezeout policies create a 
clear risk that majority owners will steal from the minority.  But solving 
this problem through unanimous voting requirements only spawns a new 
risk that minority holders will blackmail sensible transactions.  The legal 
challenge, of course, is how to balance these dual extremes of majority 
expropriation and minority holdup with a more nuanced set of rules.  Alas, 
the task is not easy.  Looking at the offer premium is rarely enough to 
separate the legitimate from the abusive.  Even a seemingly generous 
freezeout proposal, far above yesterday’s closing price, may under-
compensate minority shareholders if the risk of an abusive transaction is 
already priced into the shares.150  And for similar reasons, a dissenting 
minority owner upset at a seemingly generous offer may have legitimate 
valuation concerns instead of specious holdout aspirations. 
In recent times, lawmakers have relied on three loosely related 
requirements to strike a balance between majority and minority interests.  
First, controllers have an obligation to provide various disclosures to 
minority shareholders during a freezeout transaction.  These include reports 
on the purpose of the deal, recent information on the firm’s financial 
performance, and a copy of the fairness opinion commissioned by 
management to help determine the offer price.151  Second, minority owners 
can challenge freezeout transactions by initiating fiduciary duty lawsuits, 
though importantly the standard of review may differ significantly by deal 
 
146  See Geis, supra note 52; Subramanian, supra note 19, at 39–45; Weiss, supra note 47, at 648–
52. 
147  Subramanian, supra note 19, at 34. 
148  See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
149  But see Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1080, 1082–83 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff’d, 
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding the legality of the poison pill and declaring that free alienability 
was not one of the sticks in the bundle of property rights comprising share ownership). 
150  This ignores, of course, the fact that the minority owner may have also been able to purchase the 
shares at a discount to fair value. 
151  See SEC Schedule 13E-3, Items 6–8, 13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (2007). 
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structure.152  Finally, as we have seen, minority investors can pursue 
appraisal claims if they believe that the price of the deal is inadequate. 
It is far from clear that this troika of legal protections gets the balance 
right.  Some have argued that the framework is not terribly effective at 
shielding minority shareholders from abusive freezeouts.153  Others question 
the inconsistent treatment of similar transactions or the lack of incentives to 
adopt fair governance standards related to the deal.154  And while lawmakers 
in Delaware seem to have a good grasp on the competing considerations, 
current laws undoubtedly inject costly uncertainty into many freezeout 
transactions. 
For our purposes, however, the key question is whether amplified 
appraisal claims under Transkaryotic represent a good or bad development 
for governing the complicated relationship between majority and minority 
shareholders.  This is difficult to answer.  The cynic might insist that this 
case opens the door for a new breed of wasteful strike suits that will further 
distort the merger process.  The optimist will counter that renewed appraisal 
claims can serve as a force for good, analogous to the discipline on 
managers thought to be imposed through the market for corporate control,155 
 
152  Specifically, a statutory merger freezeout is usually subjected to an “entire fairness review,” 
though the burden of proof can differ depending on whether the firm has formed a special committee to 
evaluate and negotiate the deal or conditioned the merger on an approval vote by a majority of the 
minority shareholders.  See Geis, supra note 52, at 1182–86; Subramanian, supra note 19, at 16–17, 53.  
By contrast, Delaware courts have held that a noncoercive tender offer freezeout does not involve 
corporate self-dealing and, thus, is not subject to an entire fairness review.  Rather, the transaction 
enjoys the protection of the “business judgment rule.”  See Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 
A.2d 35, 39–40 (Del. 1996) (holding that a tender offer from majority to minority shareholders is not 
subject to entire fairness review); In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 
716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19, 21, 2001) (declining to apply entire fairness review to a tender offer 
freezeout).  A recent case suggests, however, that Delaware is rethinking this bifurcated approach and 
that we may soon see a unified standard of review for freezeout transactions, regardless of form.  See In 
re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 406–07 (Del. Ch. 2010) (advocating a unified standard- 
of-review framework that would apply to both statutory merger and tender offer freezeouts). 
153  See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 9, at 4–6. 
154  See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 19, at 58 (advocating legal reforms that harmonize the 
standard of review between statutory merger and tender offer freezeouts and provide incentives to use 
both a special deal committee and a majority of minority shareholder vote).  Vice Chancellor Strine has 
expressed similar sentiments.  See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 642–48 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (describing the incongruous standards of judicial review for freezeouts, bemoaning that 
the court, in this case, is “not presented with an opportunity to evolve the common law in this area 
because the incentives . . . make a frontal challenge to the existing regime irrational for defendants,” and 
hinting at a desire to readdress this issue in a future case). 
155  The well-known logic here is that the threat of investors launching takeover bids on a firm will 
protect against managerial incompetence.  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 112 (1st paperback ed. 1996); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173–74 (1981); Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The 
Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51 (1988); 
Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 
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by allowing activist shareholders to purchase shares and pursue large 
appraisal claims when a controller engages in an underpriced freezeout.  
How should we balance these competing claims?  And is there another 
intermediate approach that might draw upon the benefits of broader 
participation in appraisal proceedings while also tempering the risk that 
appraisal statutes will morph into a tax, or even an outright barrier, against 
sensible freezeout transactions? 
III. PIECING TOGETHER A NORMATIVE RESPONSE 
How should lawmakers react to the expansion of qualified appraisal 
rights brought on by ambiguities in the exchange infrastructure?  I will 
consider three competing ideas.  The first response is the simplest: do 
nothing.  Indeed, we might even celebrate this development as a back-end 
market check on controller expropriation.  The second response, by 
contrast, is much more difficult to implement.  It involves the rewiring of 
our exchange infrastructure to remove ownership ambiguity and specifically 
to trace each share to a vote.  The third response, my recommended 
approach, represents a legal compromise.  Lawmakers would follow the 
Transkaryotic precedent, accepting that many more investors can qualify 
for appraisal rights.  But the procedural requirements for asserting such a 
claim would be modified in a way that obligates dissenting shareholders to 
write an embedded option when initiating an appraisal demand.  This 
embedded option would essentially require each dissenter to “put his money 
where his mouth is” and thereby impose economic disincentives against 
outrageous price demands.  Yet there would be little cost to writing the 
option for blatant lowball freezeouts, allowing dissenters to comfortably 
seek appraisal.  The balance of this Article discusses these three alternative 
approaches in turn, eventually recounting the inner workings of my 
suggested compromise in some detail. 
A. Celebrate the Development as a Back-End Market Check on 
Controller Abuse 
Start by considering a different problem in corporate law. One of the 
more vexing governance concerns involves misaligned incentives between 
firm managers and investors.156  These agency costs can arise in many 
different forms, ranging from wasteful expenditures to excessive risk taking 
to managerial shirking—but they all sprout from a desire by those in control 
to take selfish actions at the expense of uninformed owners.157  The 
 
11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 29–31 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs and Property Rights in 
Corporate Assets, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 85, 96–98 (1990); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965). 
156  See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 110, at 73–75. 
157  See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 16–17 (2006). 
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distortions are impossible to solve completely; only the most altruistic agent 
will always make the same decision as an underlying principal would for 
every given situation.158  Yet one appealing strategy for mitigating this 
managerial agency cost problem comes through the notion that there is a 
market for corporate control.159 
As the theory goes, public firms plagued by especially bad managers 
will suffer a decrease in stock price, reflecting the future effects of poor 
decisions.  As the value of the firm plummets, this will attract outside 
investors who may be willing to buy the entire firm on the cheap, oust the 
scoundrels, install better managers, and profit from the entire affair when 
the stock price recovers.  This solution also has the advantage of 
overcoming free-rider effects because the acquiring investor can make a 
tender offer for all of the stock.160  There are legal barriers and other 
frictions to this market for corporate control, of course, but the ever-present 
risk of an unwelcome buyout undoubtedly curbs some managerial 
temptations to overreach. 
In this same manner, we might view expanded appraisal rights as a 
back-end market check on controller abuses.  When a controlling 
shareholder initiates a freezeout at a fair price, there is little reason for 
outside investors to buy into an appraisal claim and file a lawsuit.  But if the 
controller hopes to expropriate value from minority shareholders through a 
cut-rate offer, outside investors will have incentives to purchase the shares 
and seek appraisal under Transkaryotic.  The availability of this back-end 
market check should, in theory, expand the universe of monitors.  
Encouraging additional dissenters should also improve appraisal economics 
by allowing a petitioner to spread the fixed costs of mounting a claim over a 
larger base of minority shares.161  In short, just like the traditional market for 
corporate control dampens the shareholder–manager agency cost problem, a 
robust back-end market for appraisal rights might protect against the 
majority shareholder expropriation problem.162 
 
158  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).  The goal, then, for investors is 
to minimize these agency costs while recognizing that monitoring investments must also be taken into 
account when solving the cost function.  Id. at 357. 
159  See supra note 155. 
160  The free-rider problem presents itself in shareholder monitoring efforts because all shareholders, 
even those not contributing to monitoring costs, benefit when managerial abuses are curtailed.  This 
means that shareholders will usually lack collective incentives to fully invest in efficient monitoring.  
See, e.g., Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 429, 433 n.21, 455 & n.88 (1985); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in 
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982). 
161  In a sense, this development would allow a motivated and well-financed dissenter to 
economically circumvent the lack of availability of class action status for appraisal lawsuits. 
162  This tension can also be viewed as a strain of the agency cost problem because majority owners 
make decisions (i.e., how much to pay for the shares) that impact assets owned by another person (the 
minority shareholders). 
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Indeed, we might go further by completely eliminating the need to link 
late-purchased shares to a nonpositive merger vote.  Under this looser 
standard, any party with standing163 to seek appraisal could perfect his claim 
in Delaware simply by making a demand prior to the merger vote and then 
filing an appraisal lawsuit within 120 days of the deal’s approval.164  Thus, a 
future Carl Icahn might buy up all minority shares between the record date 
and the approval date of a freezeout and obtain full appraisal rights, even if 
some of those minority shares eventually vote for the deal.  Obviously, such 
a rule would take this notion of a back-end market check on majority 
expropriation even further, though I doubt that such an extension is 
required.  Indeed, I suspect that the practical effect of Transkaryotic is quite 
similar to whole-cloth elimination of the nonpositive voting requirement in 
the appraisal statute.165 
It is tempting to stop the analysis here and applaud the Transkaryotic 
case as a giant leap toward this back-end market for disciplining freezeouts.  
But this is not the whole story, and one must ask how controlling 
shareholders and potential claimants will react to the expanded availability 
of appraisal. 
One likely response is a move by majority owners away from 
transactions that trigger appraisal rights.  It is usually impossible to 
completely avoid appraisal during a freezeout merger.166  But controllers 
facing a risk of expanded claims may be willing to conduct a tender offer 
for most of the shares and simply forego the short form merger that triggers 
appraisal on the back end.  To be sure, this would keep minority 
shareholders on the firm’s books and thus would prevent the controller from 
taking 100% ownership of the firm (which may be a problem for going-
private transactions or other freezeout rationales).  Less-than-unanimous 
ownership might allow for continued majority expropriation, however, 
without any appraisal protection, as long as enough minority owners are 
willing to tender at the inadequate price.167  Similarly, we might expect 
 
163  I use the term standing, as defined supra note 59, to denote transactions that qualify for 
appraisal. 
164  See supra Part I.B. 
165  This is true because Cede is the record holder for so many shares and because shareholders 
selling shares between the record date and the shareholders’ meeting have little incentive to vote.  The 
combination of these effects tends to create a large pool of unvoted shares that any interested outside 
investor could use to qualify for appraisal.  There is a theoretical difference, of course, turning on 
whether some shareholders will invest the time to vote in favor of a merger after they have sold their 
stock.  This is ultimately an empirical question, and some shareholders may indeed cast all possible 
votes for a merger, even when they sell a portion of their shares on the news.  Or, there may be other 
gaming strategies that arise with the possession of empty votes.  See supra note 116.  Common sense 
suggests that most former shareholders cannot be bothered to open ballots, let alone cast votes, for 
companies they no longer own. 
166  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
167  This is a strong assumption; perhaps the fact that some minority holders are willing to tender 
removes the need for appraisal protection.  But remember that an inadequate price may not be 
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Machiavellian controllers to switch to alternative transaction forms—such 
as asset sales, generous self-dealing contracts, or other devices—to sidestep 
expanded appraisal, though these attempts might be foreclosed by fiduciary 
duty case law.168 
A different, and perhaps more pernicious, problem arises if this back-
end market check on controller abuse turns into a back-end cesspool for 
strike suits.  It is costly to defend against appraisal claims169 and a majority 
controller might rationally settle counterfeit requests to avoid litigation 
expense.  If the path of appraisal continues to widen, these statutes could 
quickly morph into a heavy tax on sensible freezeout transactions.  
Amplified appraisal might become a fashionable greenmail strategy with 
post-announcement plaintiffs buying up chunks of stock, insisting that the 
unvoted shares were “the ones” they purchased and threatening to launch a 
drawn-out appraisal proceeding unless fat envelopes are passed across the 
table.  As the risk of a 5% appraisal headache blooms to, say, 20% or 
30%—even when most voters approve the merger—some majority 
shareholders may abandon synergistic transactions.  This would be a very 
unfortunate outcome. 
It is important to note that controlling shareholders have a contractual 
strategy for responding to any uncertainty created by expanded appraisal 
rights.  They can draft a condition in the merger agreement allowing the 
transaction to be abandoned if, say, more than 10% or 20% of the shares 
demand appraisal.170  Because dissenters must file notice prior to the 
shareholders’ meeting date (and therefore before the closing date of the 
merger), a controlling shareholder protected by this condition can simply 
walk away from transactions that attract significant appraisal nuisance 
claims.  This contractual countermeasure could lead to some very 
interesting negotiation dynamics, as a controller could threaten to abandon a 
deal unless a minority plaintiff agreed to reduce the number of shares 
seeking appraisal or accept other terms.  It would also protect controllers 
against especially egregious strike suits.  But persistent dissenters may not 
abandon their claims, even when the deal contains an appraisal condition, 
and there will be social welfare losses if buyers abandon synergistic 
transactions or forego marginally sensible transactions after the cost of an 
 
immediately observable to minority shareholders if the threat of expropriation is already factored into 
current market prices.  See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
168  To be sure, the availability of fiduciary duty lawsuits provides a strong check on obvious 
managerial abuses.  But the typical firm is complex, and the resulting information asymmetries may 
make it difficult for some potential plaintiffs to uncover the abuse.  Relatedly, the theory that a market 
for corporate control is needed as a check on managerial abuse is consistent with the belief that fiduciary 
duty case law is not always sufficient to align the interests of owners and managers. 
169  Typical defense costs include both legal fees and expert witness fees, and the problem is 
potentially compounded with multiple lawsuits.  Further, as described supra note 76 and accompanying 
text, these proceedings can take years or even decades. 
170  See, e.g., Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 242. 
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“appraisal settlement tax” is factored into the calculations.  For these 
reasons, a do-nothing strategy is likely not the optimal response to 
Delaware’s expansion of appraisal rights. 
B. Reform Exchange Practices To Eliminate Ownership Ambiguity 
Imagine an old building with an electrical system that has not kept up 
with our modern need for multiple appliances in every room.  But instead of 
ripping out the fuse box and installing a systemic solution, the owner snakes 
extension cords through every corner and closet.  It works, but only just 
barely.  And things get ugly when the hair dryer, the toaster, and the 
microwave all run at the same time.  Our current system for clearing stock 
trades and for managing the accompanying transfer of voting rights operates 
in roughly the same manner.  We have kludged together something that 
works, usually, though the failures are not normally as noticeable as those 
of our dilapidated fuse box. 
This analogy raises the obvious question: Why should we plug in still 
another extension cord, grounded in legislative amendment or judicial 
opinion, to keep things plodding along?  Wouldn’t it be better to redesign 
the back-end clearinghouse systems from the ground up in order to support 
a corporate governance model that easily links shareholders to voting 
rights? 
In a perfect world we might abandon paper share certificates entirely, 
along with the complicated and multi-layered distinction between record- 
and beneficial-ownership status.171  Every share of stock would trade 
electronically through existing brokers and exchanges.  Importantly, 
however, the details of this electronic transfer would now include an 
encrypted code of numbers and letters specifically identifying each share 
that is exchanged.  Similarly, market participants would have a unique 
identification code, perhaps assigned or facilitated by a broker upon the 
creation of trading accounts.172  This information would be pooled centrally 
(ideally in real time, though batch processing might be an alternative), and 
could be accessed by an appropriate party with the right security clearance.  
Putting these two identification codes together would allow us to establish 
the exact chain of title for any single share of stock.173  In other words, 
 
171  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1238–40. 
172  Interestingly, the SEC is apparently moving in this direction for large traders by establishing a 
reporting system with unique identification codes.  See Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Larger 
Trader Reporting System (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-55.htm.  
173  One way to do this might be to append each successive buyer’s identification code to the 
electronic signature record.  For example, say stock AAPL234DFEWD342 is initially sold by Apple to 
customer 23453FDESSAD32, who then sells it to 5432FGDDGR4533, who sells it to 
FGRT78765GDED.  The serial number for the stock might read: stock; owner; new owner; new owner 
(or AAPL234DFEWD342; 23453FDESSAD32; 5432FGDDGR4533; FGRT78765GDED).  
Undoubtedly, other schemes are possible. 
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recalling an earlier example, I could now determine whether the 100 shares 
of Apple stock I just purchased were sold to me by Bill Gates or by Steve 
Jobs. 
In most cases this would not matter, and buyers would happily accept 
the economic rights that accompany each share without caring a jot about 
the serial number embedded somewhere in an electronic signature.  The 
centralized availability and use of this information, however, could 
dramatically alter shareholder-voting practices.  Firms undertaking a 
shareholder vote would still need to provide advance notification of an 
upcoming ballot so that shareholders would have enough time to muster 
information, evaluate competing proposals, and make up their minds about 
an issue.  But there would be little need to set a record date far in advance 
of the vote.  Rather, the firm could announce at, say, 4:00 PM EST on June 
15 that all shareholders will have twenty-four hours to cast an electronic 
vote.174  These votes would be gathered, signed with the string of serial 
numbers for each owner, checked against the central ownership database (to 
ensure that this owner really held the shares at 4:00 PM), and tallied 
accordingly.  This may sound like fantasy, but much of the work could 
likely take place through software coding that could be ignored by the 
average investor.  In a world where we can decode the human genome, 
organize vast volumes of Internet data, and program lifelike video games, it 
is at least worth entertaining such a project to rewire our exchange methods 
and clearing systems. 
If successful, the obvious implication is that investors could continue 
to buy and sell stock up until the very moment designated for a vote.  The 
temporal decoupling of governance rights and economic interest would be 
eliminated (or at least reduced significantly), as voting power would now 
remain attached to trades for a much longer period of time. 
Furthermore, there should be less of a need to enlist brokers or proxy-
solicitation firms to track down beneficial owners and distribute voting 
materials.  In accordance with section 213(a) of the DGCL,175 it would 
remain necessary to inform shareholders of an upcoming vote and to 
provide them with instructions on how to cast the ballot.  But this might be 
accomplished with three overlapping strategies.  First, upon announcement 
of an upcoming vote, all current shareholders could be sent this 
information—drawing upon contact information that is linked to each 
unique market participant identification code.  Second, as shares trade 
between this announcement date and the day designated for the vote, new 
purchasers could be sent this same information (again using contact 
information linked to their customer identification code).  Finally, all of the 
 
174  Paper or electronic proxies might also be used for owners without online access or for long-term 
investors who will not change their positions and who want to vote earlier than the twenty-four hour 
window—though some additional processing would obviously be required. 
175  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (2010). 
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voting information could be uploaded to a central online repository 
(perhaps maintained by a leading proxy-solicitation firm), accessible by 
anyone who is concerned that they have fallen through the cracks.176  
Because every vote would be verified by checking the stock serial numbers 
and owner records against a master centralized database, there should be no 
need to worry about former owners or unrelated parties casting fraudulent 
votes.  These would be rejected as invalid, and ballots might as well be 
made available to anyone. 
For our purposes, rewired clearinghouses would provide a very clean 
solution to the appraisal identity problem.  Dissenters would simply show 
that they did not vote any shares for the deal by presenting a voting 
confirmation report; or, alternatively, by asking for a reliable statement 
describing how all shares with their serial numbers were voted.  Claimants 
could then proceed with the appraisal litigation as before.  Importantly, 
buyers acquiring shares after the merger announcement, but before the vote, 
would no longer face a Transkaryotic problem because they could vote 
against the deal or abstain.177  Similarly, there would be no need to worry 
whether a large record holder, such as Cede, cast enough nonpositive votes 
to support all claims.  It would also be unnecessary to set rules for 
allocating qualified shares among multiple appraisal claimants, because 
share ownership would no longer be ambiguous. 
In addition to solving the appraisal puzzle, efforts to rewire the 
exchange infrastructure would generate other positive governance effects.  
Indeed, many of these other results would likely prove more important than 
the resolution of appraisal ambiguities.  For instance, we could gain 
confidence in the accuracy of shareholder votes on routine matters such as 
annual director elections and we could minimize the messy litigation that 
can arise when record holders make a mistake or fail to vote shares as 
instructed.178 
Another very interesting side effect might be the ability to drive down 
the costs of engaging in a proxy contest through the creation of this 
centralized, real-time shareholder database.  Under our current regime, it 
can be prohibitively expensive to pursue proxy contests that moot a 
 
176  Though, this should not happen as long as the owner’s contact information is current. 
177  Moreover, even if a record date is set in advance of the actual vote, the chain of title information 
for each share of stock would eliminate the Transkaryotic ambiguity: a court could simply observe how 
each share was actually voted by the previous owner and hold petitioners accountable for the 
consequences.  Related to this, a purchasing shareholder who does care strongly about the vote might 
find it easier to obtain irrevocable proxies from a seller—a person who can now be identified with 
certainty. 
178  See, e.g., Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 2010) (documenting a voting breakdown 
where the record holder did not properly transfer voting rights to beneficial holders for a closely 
contested director election). 
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contentious issue or present rival slates of directors.179  Some of this 
expense stems from the need to comply with detailed legal requirements 
governing proxy communications with shareholders.180  But another 
category of expenses arises through the practical need to conduct a political 
campaign by hiring advisors (typically lawyers and proxy-solicitation 
firms) to track beneficial owners though labyrinths of intermediary owners 
and to lobby for marginal votes.181  A centralized database of owners might 
alleviate the related identification and contact costs, thereby increasing the 
practical likelihood of using proxies for a wide variety of qualified 
governance concerns.182 
Finally, this system might help deter some of the undesirable 
consequences of empty-share voting, when franchise rights are exercised 
without economic interest.183  By linking votes to share ownership for a 
longer period of time, the regime would reduce the frequency of situations 
in which loose votes are available for sale or manipulation.184  To be sure, 
rewiring the exchange infrastructure would only solve a small fraction of 
the problem.  It might still be possible for an aspiring empty voter to buy 
and hold the actual shares, thereby retaining the vote, while hedging the 
economic risks of ownership through swaps or through other customized 
 
179  See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to 
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1767, 1771 (2006) 
(describing the high cost of proxy battles); Institutional Shareholder Services, U.S. Proxy Voting 
Manual, GOVERNANCE ANALYTICS, http://governanceanalytics.com/content/menutop/content/
subscription/usvmfiles/proxy-contests.html#AEN1282 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (“[A] proxy contest 
typically costs between $1 million and $15 million . . . .”).  To take one salient example, the proxy 
contest related to a merger between Hewlett-Packard Co. and Compaq Computer Corp. is estimated to 
have cost over $200 million.  Gary McWilliams & Pui-Wing Tam, H-P Battle Raises Bar for Proxy 
Costs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002, at A4. 
180  The primary regulatory framework arises under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 
which prohibits parties from soliciting proxies (defined broadly) in violation of SEC rules.  17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-3 (2010).  These rules also require anyone soliciting a proxy to prepare and distribute a proxy 
statement to shareholders.  See id. § 240.14a-4 to -5. 
181  See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 5. 
182  Indeed, I would predict that one implication of easier access to shareholders would be a much 
greater emphasis on the federal laws that regulate the issues and requirements to secure proxy access for 
shareholder proposals.  On this topic, see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy 
Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347 (2011). 
183  See Hu & Black, Hedge Funds, supra note 116 (describing the concerns with empty voting and 
especially the possibility that votes will be cast against the best interest of the firm for other reasons 
relating to private gain); Hu & Black The New Vote Buying, supra note 116 (same); Robert B. 
Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 160–62 (2009) (expressing 
concerns about voting by parties with no economic interest). 
184  The wisdom of allowing shareholder votes to be sold in public or private markets has been 
debated for some time now.  Compare Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an 
Incentive Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21 (2006) (discussing some potential economic benefits of 
permissive markets for votes), and Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An 
Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964) (advocating unrestricted vote 
selling), with Thompson & Edelman, supra note 183, at 162–66 (doubting the wisdom of vote sales). 
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derivative transactions,185 so it would take much more to close down empty 
voting.  These and other governance implications are worth exploring in 
more detail, but I will not do so in this Article. 
Establishing a better method for settling stock trades would likely 
solve the appraisal puzzle and increase the accuracy of shareholder 
elections.  But this is a long-term project—one that is unlikely to gain 
traction for some time.186  The immediate challenge is technological: how to 
actually create the system described above (or some functional equivalent) 
at the scale needed to handle some 7.5 million or more shares every single 
trading day.187  I suspect, though of course I cannot be certain, that 
something could be worked out with enough time and money.  But this 
project would surely introduce unexpected side effects that would require a 
dedicated effort to solve.  It would be a massive undertaking, requiring 
considerable resources, even in a world of skilled software programmers, 
powerful supercomputers, and cheap online storage.188 
This brings us to the real question: Who has the incentives to undertake 
an infrastructure rewiring project, and how would they pay for everything?  
Many people would benefit from stock-clearing reforms: investors (through 
better governance and perhaps higher firm values), aspiring managers 
(through an ability to mount proxy contests), adjudicators (through clearer 
governance mechanisms), and perhaps those responsible for operating the 
new system (if they can command a reasonable profit for their services).  
But there is an obvious free-rider problem because once the clearinghouse 
is established, everyone can take the benefits without necessarily 
contributing funds for the completion of the efforts. 
Furthermore, this project only makes sense when conducted as a “big 
bang” initiative.  It does little good for a firm to embrace this half-heartedly, 
 
185  This was the strategy employed in the now-famous Mylan/King merger, where a large 
shareholder in the target firm purchased shares in the acquiring firm so he could vote for the transaction 
on both sides in order to increase the odds of approval and thereby realize a large premium on his target 
shares.  See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 183, at 153–54.  In implementing this strategy, the 
shareholder hedged away his economic interest in the acquiring firm, calling into question whether his 
ability to vote was really in the best interest of the acquiring firm’s owners.  Id. 
186  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1280–81 (cautioning that necessary reforms require 
significant reorganization of the system, demand significant expenses, and promise uncertain results). 
187  Large exchanges measure a listed volume statistic: all shares traded in all markets for a given 
period of time.  Daily listed volume can vary significantly, but some longer-term averages are 
informative.  As of April 21, 2011, seventy-seven trading days had elapsed.  During this time 
approximately 419 million shares traded on the NYSE, 63 million shares traded on the ARCA/AMEX, 
and 102 million shares traded on the NASDAQ.  Adding these results yields total listed volume of 584 
million shares—roughly 7.5 million shares per trading day.  See Daily Market Summary, NYSE 
EURONEXT (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.nyse.com/financials/1108407157455.html. 
188  It is worth noting that the SEC is seeking public comments on a wide number of these “proxy 
plumbing” issues, and it is possible that additional resources will be earmarked for a reform.  See 
Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Release Nos. 34-62495, IA-3052, IC-29340, 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240, 270, 274, 275 (July 14, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495.pdf. 
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say by stamping serial numbers on some of its shares and leaving the rest to 
trade as fungible bulk.  Similarly, all active traders would require an 
identification code; everything breaks down with even a small minority of 
unidentified buyers.189  It may be possible to establish pilot efforts or dual-
system clearing,190 but obviously a full-scale change would raise significant 
coordination challenges. 
These free-rider and coordination problems raise a legitimate case for 
using government action to bankroll and establish the reforms.191  But public 
money is not exactly flowing these days, and the current system seems to 
work, if crudely.  It may be difficult to muster the political mandate 
necessary to take on this project.  Moreover, public suspicion about the use 
of government funds to support capital market renovation efforts, along 
with the private incentives of some parties to maintain the status quo, 
combine to suggest that any such rewiring project will be controversial.192 
This is not to say that these reforms are a bad idea.  Indeed, there may 
be substantial social gains to such an effort.193  But the mammoth 
complexity, cost, and coordination required by a greenfield approach 
suggest that we will not arrive easily at this destination.  Accordingly, I am 
interested in the possibility of a nearer term legal compromise to manage 
the impact of asynchronous voting on the appraisal remedy. 
C. Adjust Appraisal Rules as a Legal Compromise 
One of the more exciting developments in economic theory posits that 
incentive-molding rules can corral parties towards optimal social ends, 
strictly by appealing to their rational self-interest.194  If these ideas can be 
put into practice, it may become possible for policymakers to promote 
better substantive outcomes while also reducing the transaction costs arising 
through adversarial legal proceedings.195 
In the appraisal context, the challenge is to craft a legal entitlement that 
smokes out the fair price for a share of stock.  We have seen how awarding 
too much power to a controlling shareholder can tempt expropriation, as the 
 
189  Given the high frequency of trades and the close margins in some contested mergers (those ripe 
for the appraisal problem), even if a small percentage of traders do not have tracking IDs, the number of 
shares that get lost in the shuffle might exceed the vote margin. 
190  The notion here is that trades would continue as normal, but over time an electronic signature 
would be added to more and more trades.  Eventually, the system could be “switched on,” run in parallel 
for some time to permit testing, and eventually take over as the exclusive trading method. 
191  The government incentives to fund such a project are another matter, however, though one might 
argue that efficiencies from better capital allocation and improved governance would be substantial.  
Such claims would be quite difficult to quantify. 
192  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1278–79. 
193  See supra notes 171–85 and accompanying text. 
194  For an illustration of the possible social welfare benefits, see sources cited supra note 31. 
195  Id. 
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stock is sold for an inadequate price.196  Conversely, granting broad property 
rights to minority shareholders through, say, unanimous voting 
requirements, can promote holdout problems and prompt demands for 
super-compensatory payments.197  In a perfect world, we would divine the 
true value of each share and reward or punish each claimant as appropriate.  
But the high degree of uncertainty and judgment underlying any valuation 
exercise, combined with the pressures and biases of litigation, make this 
approach impossible.198  Can we walk the tightrope between holdout and 
expropriation with a more nuanced legal entitlement? 
The main idea requires separating the event of demanding a price from 
the knowledge about whether a claimant will be buying or selling at this 
stated figure.  By tossing a veil of ignorance over the consequences of any 
price statement, policymakers can essentially force a claimant to put her 
money where her mouth is.199  When freezeouts are abusive, a minority 
shareholder should be quite comfortable naming a higher price—even if she 
is eventually forced to buy at this sum.  Extortionate claims, on the other 
hand, should be dissuaded by the possibility that the bluff will be called—
requiring the claimant to buy shares at this inflated price.  The overall 
framework is simply a variation on the familiar scenario where Johnny 
divides the cake and Janet chooses the first piece. 
Specifically, these incentives can be introduced into appraisal 
proceedings by adding one more statutory requirement for claim perfection: 
every petitioner must write an embedded option allowing the controlling 
shareholder200 to sell a share of stock (for each share seeking appraisal) back 
to the petitioner at the exact same price that the claimant demands under the 
appraisal request.  So if I own a share of Berkshire Hathaway and Warren 
 
196  See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
197  See supra Part II.C. 
198  It has long been understood that judges are not business experts and that much of corporate law 
is based on judicial restraint regarding the second-guessing of many business decisions.  Judicial 
valuation efforts in the appraisal context are, of course, a partial exception to this philosophy.  See supra 
note 74. 
199  See Fennell, supra note 31. 
200  There is an important design question here: whether the embedded option should be written to 
the controlling shareholder or to the firm itself.  Consistent with my focus on freezeout transactions, I 
will assume in this Article that the embedded option is owned and exercisable by a controlling 
shareholder (though obviously this would need to be defined in statutory amendments at a threshold 
level, perhaps 40%).  It is certainly possible, however, to require any appraisal petitioner to write the 
embedded option to the firm itself.  This approach has the advantage of introducing the right incentives 
for non-freezeout appraisal claims (as was the case in Transkaryotic) because dissenters will not wish to 
assert unreasonable price demands.  But giving the option to the firm may weaken incentives during a 
freezeout transaction (even if the controller has effective power over the management’s decision 
whether to exercise the embedded put) because the gains from dissenter overreaching would be shared 
by all of the shareholders (not just the controller).  Perhaps the ideal solution is a hybrid approach, 
where an option must be given to controlling shareholders if they exist; otherwise, it must be written to 
the firm. 
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Buffett announces a freezeout at $100,000, I can perfect an appraisal 
demand for $150,000 through the usual methods.  But I also need to include 
a put option allowing Buffett to sell me an additional share at $150,000.  He 
is, of course, free to exercise or to ignore the option, as he wishes. 
It may seem strange to force claimants to pay a fee—in the form of the 
embedded option grant—to obtain the legal protections offered by the 
appraisal remedy.  But there is no reason why the law cannot parse this 
statutory entitlement more finely; no one is obligated to seek appraisal, and 
lawmakers should feel free to require this additional obligation if there is a 
good reason to do so.  And indeed there is: it is this uncertainty about 
whether each claimant will be buying or selling that promotes an accurate 
price demand and drives down the administrative costs of appraisal 
proceedings (in the form of fewer contested cases).201  Further, this 
embedded option should cost relatively little to write for bona fide claims, 
where the petitioner believes that the exercise price is at or out of the 
money.202  This is not to say, of course, that an out-of-the-money option is 
costless to write; the duration term must be kept quite short, perhaps one or 
two weeks, to prevent this new requirement from becoming yet another tool 
for majority expropriation.203 
It is worth working through an extended example to flesh out the 
effects (and potential failure points) of this appraisal compromise.  Come 
back to a simplified version of Transkaryotic: let us assume again that a 
single 60% shareholder wants to conduct a statutory freezeout merger at 
$37.204  Twenty percent of the shares now trade frequently between small 
holders on the public markets.  The balance of shares are owned by two 
other investors: Albert and Beth.  Albert owns 10% of the firm; he has held 
these shares for the past decade and believes that the freezeout price is 
 
201  See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
202  If a claimant demands exactly fair value, the put would be at the money.  If the claimant is 
willing to accept a little less, the put moves out of the money.  Other variables at the time of the option 
grant will also contribute to the value of the option, including the volatility of the stock and the duration 
of the put option. 
203  For example, a dissenter may price the put (through her appraisal claim) at what she believes is 
fair value only to have subsequent adverse information drive down the fair price.  An opportunistic 
controller may take advantage of this to exercise the put under these circumstances, though he was not 
previously planning to do so.  It is not easy to mitigate the effects of firm volatility, but this concern can 
be minimized by requiring a short duration for the option.  It might be sensible to couple this with a 
slightly shorter notification timeline under section 262(d)(1) of the DGCL.  See supra note 67.  Finally, 
a risk-averse dissenter may also wish to hedge this risk by purchasing put options on the stock with 
similar duration and strike price variables. 
204  I use a statutory freezeout, as opposed to a tender offer freezeout, simply to set up a scenario 
where appraisal rights attach with the initial transaction.  The analysis would be similar if the controller 
pursued a tender offer freezeout followed by a short form merger, thereby triggering appraisal rights. Of 
course it could be difficult for the controlling shareholder to obtain the 90% ownership threshold needed 
to conduct a short form merger given the minority ownership blocks and viewpoints on the deal.  I also 
ignore the effects of any takeover defenses that may be in place. 
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generous and fair.  Beth owns the remaining 10%, a position she has also 
maintained for years.  Unlike Albert, however, Beth feels that this price is 
inadequate and that the stock is really worth $50.  The final player is Carl.  
Carl does not yet own shares, but he hunts for situations where he can 
squeeze out money through a strike suit.  He doubts that the shares are 
worth more than $37.  Carl is familiar with the amplified appraisal strategy, 
however, and he is considering a plan to buy some shares, bring an 
appraisal claim for $80, and convince the controller to settle at $60.  
Assume, finally, that all shares are deposited with Cede, and that 
Delaware’s appraisal statute has been modified to require dissenters to write 
an embedded put option (as described above) in order to perfect their 
appraisal rights.  How will each of our parties act? 
Albert is easy to analyze.  He is pleased with the $37 freezeout price 
and will simply accept the money without considering an appraisal claim.  
He will probably vote for the merger, though he may decide not to bother 
voting if he recognizes that the controller can approve the deal with his 60% 
stake.205  Alternatively, if the public market price for the stock rises to $37 
on the news of the deal, Albert may just sell his shares to another investor 
prior to the freezeout.  If this happens after the vote is severed from 
economic ownership, Albert may be even less inclined to vote on the 
merger. 
Beth faces a more complex decision.  But if she truly believes that $37 
is a lowball offer, Beth may file an appraisal claim.206  As a first step, she 
will instruct Cede to vote all of her shares against the merger.  This cannot 
block the deal, of course, as the freezeout will garner a 60% or higher 
approval rate (depending on the actions of Albert and the small investors).  
Yet this will provide Beth with enough nonpositive votes to qualify for 
appraisal.  She complies with the other requirements for appraisal, and then, 
as the final step in claim perfection, Beth writes an embedded option to the 
controller allowing him to sell her up to 10% of his stock at $50 per share.  
She may be nervous about the possibility that this option will be exercised, 
but she should be willing to write the option if she feels that $37 is truly 
inadequate.207  After all, this is what she is demanding of the controller, and 
she is free to choose any exercise price. 
 
205  This assumes that the controller has not engineered a majority of the minority voting condition 
into the approval process.  See supra note 152 (describing this process and its effect on the legal 
standard of review). 
206  I will place her other main option—filing a fiduciary duty lawsuit to challenge the freezeout—to 
the side to illustrate the effects of my proposed appraisal reforms.  Depending on the facts of the 
situation, it may indeed be possible to win a fiduciary duty case, though the controller may take 
measures (such as appointing a special committee of directors) to obtain an accommodating standard of 
review. 
207  Careful readers may observe that the controller has an incentive to purchase 10% of the shares 
on the public market at $37 and sell them to Beth at $50.  But this assumes that Beth remains passive 
and that the public share price stays at $37.  Indeed, if Beth really believes that the stock is worth $50 
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Given the risk of performing on the option, however, Beth may decide 
to lower her appraisal claim slightly in order to pocket a small (perceived) 
profit if the controller does exercise the option.  For instance, she might 
request an appraisal price of $49.  If the controller accedes to this lower 
request, Beth will not receive the entire $50 per share.  But if the controller 
does exercise the embedded option, Beth will make a dollar per share 
(according to her valuation estimates of $50).  Regardless, Beth should not 
be deterred from making a claim that she views as legitimate. 
How will the controller respond to Beth’s appraisal demand?  He has 
three primary options: (1) pay her the $50 per share, (2) exercise the 
embedded option and sell her a 10% block at $50, or (3) litigate the 
appraisal request.  This decision will depend on a number of variables, 
including the controller’s inner views about a fair price for the stock and 
whether he is willing to relinquish some control.  If the controller is trying 
to expropriate value—and the fair price really is $50 or higher—then he 
will not want to exercise the embedded option.  Instead, the controller may 
just pay off Beth to get the deal through, perhaps still profiting from 
Albert’s inability to recognize the abuse.  It is also possible that the 
controller will litigate, hoping to convince a court that the $37 is fair, 
though this strategy entails significant publicity, costs, and risks.208 
On the other hand, if Beth and the controller simply have different 
views about the value of the stock (perhaps because one or the other is 
misinformed), then the controller may be happy to exercise the option.  This 
would, of course, mean that his position drops to 50%, and that Beth’s 
ownership rises to 20%.  The majority owner needs to be willing to narrow 
his control position, and this could serve as a theoretical barrier to free 
exercise of the put option.  In extreme cases, it might even require the 
majority holder to abandon control.209  I suspect, however, that minority 
ownership blocks will often be less concentrated, reducing the 
disinclination of a majority owner to put shares to a greedy dissenter. 
One other concern is worth addressing: counterparty liquidity.  In order 
for the compromise to work as planned, Beth must be willing to challenge 
inadequate deals.  Yet in order to do this, she must have adequate liquid 
resources to stand behind the embedded put if the controller elects to 
exercise it.  If Beth has a broad liquid portfolio or access to credit markets, 
then this should not present a problem.  But this fear of mustering resources 
 
(and has ample financial reserves), she should be willing to buy the loose shares herself at any price up 
to $50 and claim appraisal rights for this incremental position.  Even if she lacks resources, we might 
expect other players to step in if the fair price of the stock really is $50.  And finally, recall that Beth 
herself named this $50 price.  Said differently, this example does not embrace the strong form of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis. 
208  It may also be difficult to argue that the $37 price is fair when the controller is unwilling to sell 
some of his shares at the much higher price of $50 via the embedded option. 
209  To illustrate, change the initial facts so that Beth holds a 20% stake and the small public owners 
hold just 10% of the firm. 
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to stand behind the embedded put may theoretically prevent some dissenters 
from challenging abusive freezeouts.  Related to this, a controller may not 
believe that a financially weak dissenter’s embedded put is “real” and may 
just litigate outrageous demands instead of attempting to collect from a 
counterparty who is unlikely to stand behind her position.210 
Finally, does Carl qualify for appraisal rights, and, if so, how will he 
behave?  Let us assume that he buys a 10% block at $37 (after the record 
date, but before the vote) from Albert, who has sold on the news.  If Albert 
does not bother to vote the shares, then Carl can use this unvoted pool to 
request appraisal—following the precedent of Transkaryotic.  Interestingly, 
even if Albert votes for the merger, Carl may claim that he can use Beth’s 
dissenting shares to pursue his claim.  We do not know how a court would 
handle a situation where 20% of the shares vie for the 10% voted against 
the deal.  And the answer here will also depend on the voting actions of the 
other small shareholders.  But let us assume, arguendo, that Carl can qualify 
for appraisal.  Would he mount his strike claim at $80, seeking to settle at 
$60?  Probably not.  Carl really believes that the stock is worth just $37, 
and he will be terrified about the new requirement to couple an embedded 
put option with his $80 price request.  It is very likely that the controller 
would exercise the option, and knowing this, Carl would never initiate the 
claim in the first place.  This is a very good outcome: we have deterred a 
specious claim.211 
Might Carl purchase an even greater block or collude with other 
minority investors to reinstate an appraisal strike suit?  On these facts, it is 
difficult to see how; even if Carl buys the entire 40% minority stake, the 
controller could exercise the embedded put to collect $80 for each of these 
shares.  Indeed, he should be happy to increase his profits by doing so.  If 
we change the initial facts slightly, however, such that the controller starts 
with a 40% stake, then Carl may buy up more shares than the controller can 
sell under the put.  Still, the controller should be happy to put the 40% of 
the shares back to Carl, who has effectively launched a competing buyout at 
$80.  Finally, the controller does not ever need to exercise the put; he can 
always just challenge the appraisal demand as before. 
The upshot of all this, then, is a compromise framework that should 
provide genuine relief for oppressed shareholders and weaker incentives for 
plaintiffs to engage in spurious strike suits against a firm.  Moreover, it 
might help to slash the legal costs necessary to obtain fair judgment, as 
there would often be less need to divine a stock’s fair value through 
 
210  Of course liquidity and creditworthiness are always concerns with asynchronous transactions.  It 
is possible that the usual mechanisms for establishing counterparty trust, such as bonding or escrow 
arrangements, might also be used in this context. 
211  In the absence of the embedded option feature, Carl would have little reason to avoid the strike 
suit.  See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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competing expert witness testimony.212  This should be seen as a significant 
benefit; the typical appraisal case consumes copious professional and 
judicial resources to debate the inner details and assumptions of valuation 
models.213 
Of course, the ultimate advantage of modifying appraisal rights in this 
manner is an ability to tap into the benefits of a back-end market check on 
freezeout pricing, while simultaneously moderating concerns about strike 
suits.  With these reforms in place, lawmakers should be quite comfortable 
with the likelihood that Transkaryotic will result in a broader pipeline of 
appraisal claimants.  Indeed, we should welcome the additional attention 
that will be placed on freezeout transactions by investors who might have 
previously ignored these deals.  These new players will have incentives to 
police expropriation but little reason (or ability) to pursue strike suits.  In 
short, come one, come all, as long as petitioners are placed in situations in 
which outrageous price demands may come back to haunt them. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the DGCL, minority shareholders who are disappointed with the 
price that they receive in a freezeout merger must bring appraisal claims 
through the record holder of the stock.  But back-office settlement practices 
have evolved such that one entity, the DTC, now serves as a giant, 
perpetual record holder for the vast majority of shares.  This means that 
appraisal petitioners, following recent Chancery Court precedent, can 
effectively sidestep a key statutory requirement to abstain or vote against 
the deal.  This is true even when the claimants purchase shares after voting 
rights have been severed from economic ownership.  The upshot of all this 
is that appraisal claims will likely multiply, taking on greater significance in 
the governance battles between majority and minority shareholders. 
This Article has wrestled with the implications of expanded appraisal.  
The good news is that increased attention on freezeout transactions may 
serve as a back-end market check and may thereby chill majority 
expropriation.  The bad news is that streamlining the path to appraisal may 
induce strike suits that block sensible transactions.  My suggested 
compromise is to modify appraisal statutes by adopting procedural methods 
for eliciting and awarding the revealed subjective value of dissenting 
shareholders.  If successful, these reconstituted appraisal rights would 
encourage dissenters to protest truly abusive transactions while 
undercutting the incentives to file illegitimate claims. 
 
212  See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
213  For example, a research assistant and I conducted an analysis of all Delaware appraisal cases 
from 1999 to 2009.  The results suggest that roughly 75% of the forty-seven cases involve valuation 
methodology disputes.  By contrast, just 17% of the cases debate whether appraisal is available for a 
given transaction, and 12% of the cases litigate whether some other procedural matter has been satisfied. 
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Along the way, the discussion has also offered a salient illustration of a 
much broader problem in corporate law: dysfunctional shareholder voting 
practices caused by complexity in the exchange infrastructure.  Our mental 
model of corporate governance envisions a stable group of shareholders 
with ample time to deliberate on key balloting issues and cast meaningful 
votes.  In actuality, the mechanisms for managing and tallying shareholder 
votes encompass intricate layers of intermediaries that do not inspire 
confidence in accurate outcomes.  In this context, the appraisal puzzle is 
simply the latest manifestation of a much more pervasive concern. 
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